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FOREWORD 
As Dag Hammarskjold said to me on one occasion, there 
are things that cannot be done every day but must be done from 
time to time. He was referring to a report presented by our 
secretariat, with the co-operation of a group of eminent Latin 
Americans, to the ill-fated Quintandinha conference (November 
1954), at the request of the Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council of the Organization of American States.* This is another 
such report. It is the outcome of our great concern for the course 
of events in this part of the world—a concern which, on the occa-
sion of the ECLA secretariat's fifteenth anniversary, finds ex-
pression in the reflections set forth in the ensuing pages. They 
should also be viewed as representing a needful "creative pause" 
on the part of one who has been in charge of the secretariat 
throughout almost the whole of that period. 
The report presented here constitutes by its very nature a 
fabric of inevitable generalizations drawn from continuous and 
systematic analysis of the real state of affairs in Latin America. 
But they do not relate to any individual country or group of 
leaders, since the divergencies that would have to be noted are 
many and significant. 
Nevertheless, it is our hope that within the pattern of this 
fabric each country may find a clue to the significance of its own 
special case, at this time of imperative need to consider what our 
past has been, what our present is, and what we should wish to 
make of our future through the exercise of deliberate control over 
the forces of economic and social development. 
Raúl PREBISCH 
* See International Co-operation in a Latin American Development 
Policy (E/CN.12/359), United Nations publication, Sales No.: 54.II.G.2. 
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A. THE GENERAL THESIS 

1. Structural reforms to clear the way for development 
The ills besetting the Latin American economy are not deter-
mined by circumstantial or transient factors. They are an expres-
sion of the critical state of affairs in our time and of the incapacity 
of the economic system—owing to structural defects that it has 
been beyond our ability or our power to remedy—to achieve and 
maintain a rate of development consonant with the growth of the 
population and with its demands for a speedy improvement in its 
levels of living. 
The increase in the population is certainly phenomenal. At the 
beginning of the century, there were 63 million inhabitants in 
Latin America, and the annual rate of demographic growth was 
1.8 per cent. Now we number 220 million, and we are multiplying 
at an annual rate of 2.9 per cent which shows signs of rising even 
higher.1 
On the basis of conjectural data, it may be estimated that 
about half the existing population has a tiny average personal 
income of 120 dollars a year.2 And this vast social aggregate 
accounts for only about one-fifth of total personal consumption 
in Latin America, showing the highest coefficients of under-
nourishment, poor clothing and worse housing, as well as of 
disease and illiteracy; and, at the same time, the highest rates 
of reproduction. 
It is here that the development effort must primarily be con-
centrated. The notion, which dies hard, that development takes 
place spontaneously, without a rational and deliberate effort to 
achieve it, has proved to be an illusion, both in Latin America and 
in the other peripheral regions of the world. For a century now 
our economies have been linked to the international economy, and 
fifty per cent of the population is still stagnating in pre-capitalist 
conditions which are incompatible with its growing economic and 
social aspirations. 
Even so, average per capita income in Latin America is 
appreciably higher than in other peripheral regions, and thus 
affords an advantageous starting-point for the realization of 
l l n 1900 the population increased by 1.1 million inhabitants, and in 
1960 by 6.4 million—almost six times that figure. 
2
 See the chapter on "Income distribution in Latin America" in The 
Economic Development of Latin America m the Post-War Period (E/CN 
12/659/Rev.l), United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.II.G.6. 
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what is no longer a Utopian dream: the eradication of poverty 
and its inherent evils, by virtue of the tremendous potential of 
contemporary technology and the possibility of assimilating it 
more quickly than was the case with the capitalistic evolution of 
the more advanced countries. 
However, this rapid penetration of technique demands and 
carries with it radical changes: changes both in the pattern of 
production and in the structure of the economy which could not 
be effectively brought about without a basic reform of the social 
structure. 
The social structure prevalent in Latin America constitutes a 
serious obstacle to technical progress and, consequently, to eco-
nomic and social development. The principal manifestations of this 
fact are: 
(a) The structure in question considerably hampers social 
mobility, that is, the emergence and rise of the dynamic elements 
in society, men of drive and initiative, capable of taking risks and 
responsibilities both in technical and economic matters and in the 
other aspects of community life ; 
(b) The social structure is largely characterized by a situa-
tion of privilege in the distribution of wealth and therefore of 
income. Privilege weakens or destroys the incentive to economic 
activity, to the detriment of the efficient utilization of human 
resources, land and machinery; 
(c) This state of privilege in regard to distribution is reflected 
not in a rapid rate of net capital formation, but in extravagant 
patterns of consumption in the upper strata of society, over against 
the unsatisfactory living conditions of the broad masses of the 
population. 
In these days of zeal for planning there is a great deal of talk 
about the prime importance of the role of private enterprise in 
Latin America and the need to keep it intact. But what is meant 
by this, in the last analysis ? Is it suggested that the present system, 
under which the energies of individual initiative are cramped by 
social stratification and privilege, should be kept intact? Or is the 
way to be cleared for this initiative by the structural reforms 
referred to, so that the system may acquire the full dynamic 
force it lacks at present? 
2. Capital formation and income distribution 
The test of a system's dynamic strength lies in its ability to 
accelerate the rate of development and progressively improve the 
distribution of income. If the annual rate of growth of average 
per capita income could be raised from the very low figure of 1 per 
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cent registered of late to a minimum of 3 per cent in Latin America 
as a whole, a rational redistribution policy would enable the per-
sonal income of the under-privileged half of the population to be 
doubled in seventeen years, and the lot of the middle-income groups 
to be improved likewise, although at a less rapid rate. 
This is where the first step towards reform of the social 
structure becomes essential, since such a rate of growth is not 
feasible without substantial restriction of the consumption of the 
higher-income brackets. 
The social contrast is striking indeed. While 50 per cent of 
the population accounts for approximately two-tenths of total per-
sonal consumption, at the other end of the scale of distribution 
5 per cent of the inhabitants of the region enjoy nearly three-
tenths of that total, according to the conjectural estimates referred 
to above. A policy of austerity mainly affecting this latter social 
group, and supplemented by the contribution of international re-
sources, would permit an increase in net capital formation and 
the attainment of the above-mentioned growth target for per 
capita income, while at the same time redistribution policy would 
see to it that the income increment thus obtained was passed on 
to the lower strata of the social aggregate. 
Herein lies the essence of redistribution policy. It is not a 
matter of taking income away from the upper minority and simply 
distributing it among the broad masses of the population, for with 
per capita personal income in Latin America as a whole barely 
amounting to 370 dollars, the benefits of such a redistribution 
would not stretch very far. But if, on the other hand, restrictions 
on the consumption of the privileged groups were reflected in a 
steady increase in net capital formation, the standard of living of 
the bulk of the population would rise progressively faster. 
Technology has made this dynamic concept of redistribution 
viable for the first time in history, for without the immense poten-
tial it places at the disposal of developing countries, the effects 
of the redistribution operation would be very limited in their scope. 
Thus, the problems of capital formation and income distribution 
assume very different forms from those they took during the 
capitalistic evolution of the more advanced countries. 
At that time it was capital formation that came first, and the 
gradual redistribution of income followed. Now, on the other 
hand, both these requirements present themselves—as they are 
bound to do—simultaneously, under the increasing political and 
trade-union pressure exerted by the lower income groups. 
_ The only available means of meeting them is by directly com-
bating one of the anomalies that most affect the development of 
Latin America, namely, the marked failure of capital formation to 
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reach the levels demanded by contemporary technology, as against 
the extravagant pattern of consumption of the high-income groups. 
Among these upper strata (5 per cent of the population), 
which account for about three-tenths of Latin America's total 
consumption, average consumption per household is fifteen times 
greater than that of the lower strata (50 per cent of the popula-
tion). If this ratio were reduced to 11:1, by the restriction of 
consumption in favour of increased investment, the annual rate 
of growth of per capita income could rise from 1 per cent to 3 per 
cent. And if restriction of consumption brought the ratio down 
to 9:1, the rate of growth might reach 4 per cent or even more, 
according to the political feasibility of this operation and the 
capacity of each country to put it into effect. 
3. International co-operation and the structure of trade 
This capacity might be seriously handicapped by the external 
bottleneck in development, which, in conjunction with the limita-
tions of domestic production of capital goods, would make it im-
possible for all the additional saving obtained to be invested in 
such goods. Hence the vital need for international resources, until 
the structural reforms advocated here enable full advantage to be 
taken of the increase in savings. 
The contribution to be made by international resources is thus 
of a temporary nature. It would cease to be necessary once the 
reforms referred to had borne the full crop of results to be ex-
pected of them. They are not a matter for Latin America alone, 
since it is also essential to work for the elimination of the external 
bottleneck by remodelling the existing structure of international 
trade. 
The countries in which industrialization advances most rapidly 
tend to be affected more and more by the bottleneck in question. 
Their difficulties do not originate solely in the social structure, 
but also in the type of trade structure which characterized the 
epoch of externally-geared development that preceded the world 
depression of the thirties. Here again, as in other aspects of Latin 
America's development problems, a whole constellation of out-of-
date ideas survives. It is true that the industrialization of the 
peripheral regions has at last been accepted as an indispensable 
requisite for economic development. But what is still perpetuated 
is the anachronistic trade pattern inherent in the peculiar concept 
of the international division of labour which was prevalent up to 
a short time ago—the trading of primary commodities against 
manufactured goods. This is the framework within which the 
industrialization of the Latin American countries has been taking 
place. And the obstacle to economic development that it represents 
is now beginning to loom larger at every turn, for whereas the 
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upward trend of demand for the manufactured goods we import 
is very sharp, primary exports are expanding relatively slowly, 
largely for reasons over which the Latin American countries have 
no control. Thus there is a latent tendency towards disequilibrium 
which is aggravated as economic development gains speed. 
This is a new phenomenon not experienced by the more ad-
vanced countries in the past. Hence it is that only now is its sig-
nificance beginning to be understood, and recognition accorded to 
the vital need to encourage the industrial exports of the peripheral 
countries, especially those which have completed the first stage of 
the industrialization process. 
This encouragement of industrial exports, in addition to ex-
ports of primary commodities, cannot be achieved within the 
narrow bounds of the existing markets. It is essential to alter the 
geographical structure of trade, as well as its composition by 
products. 
Latin America's exports are of course affected by the uni-
versal slowness of the growth of demand for primary commodities, 
in contrast with the buoyancy of demand for manufactured goods 
as per capita income rises. But this circumstance conjoins with 
other factors of considerable importance. In the first place, the 
moderate rate of economic development of the United States has 
combined with its import restrictions to exert an adverse influence 
on Latin America's export trade. And, secondly, the protection 
and discrimination practised by the European Common Market 
prevent us from taking full advantage of the steady expansion of 
demand for primary commodities in the vast economic area it 
represents. 
Without prejudice to measures aimed at eliminating or reduc-
ing these barriers to trade, it is a matter of urgent necessity to 
explore, with the utmost diligence, the possibilities for trade with 
other regions of the world, especially those—the socialist econo-
mies, for example—which show a high rate of development. 
While it is true that basically the solution of such problems 
depends upon the great industrial countries and the degree to 
which their trade policy favours liberalization, it is no less certain 
that the Latin American countries too must put forth a tremendous 
effort in the same direction. In this sense, the formation of a 
common market is an undertaking that brooks no delay. Its im-
portance has been realized by the Central American countries, 
whose determination to establish such a market has been bold and 
resolute. The problem of the Latin American Free-Trade Asso-
ciation is more difficult, for the very reason that the development 
of industrialization in watertight compartments has created vested 
interests and prejudices which oppose reciprocal trade without 
taking account of the serious effects of such an attitude on eco-
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nomic development. This is not a merely technical matter; it is a 
question of important policy decisions which must follow up the 
Montevideo Treaty. The technical groundwork for these decisions 
is basically complete; all that remains to be done is to study and 
select the best ways of putting them into practice. 
4. The closed type of development in Latin America 
The external bottleneck in development is not due solely to 
the slow upward trend of exports of primary commodities as 
against the rapid expansion of industrial imports from the great 
centres, or to the low level of inter-Latin American trade; it has 
also largely been determined, in recent years, by the deterioration 
of the terms of trade and its serious effects on the purchasing 
power of exports. The action of all these factors in combination 
reduced the per capita value of Latin America's exports from 
58 dollars in 1930 to 39 dollars in 1960 (at 1950 prices). 
The recent decline in the terms of trade is yet another indica-
tion of the peripheral countries' inherent incapacity to retain the 
whole of the benefits accruing from their technical progress. There 
is not much consolation to be had from the reflection that in the 
future, when the Latin American countries reach more advanced 
stages of development and their industrialization process is com-
plete, this state of affairs will some day be brought to an end; 
it will all take a long time, and in the meanwhile the deterioration 
of the terms of trade is aggravating the external bottleneck and 
exerting a marked depressive influence on domestic capacity for 
capital formation, to the detriment of development itself. 
From a different angle, the other notion that still survives in 
some circles, to the effect that the external bottleneck and the 
disequilibria in international accounts in which it is reflected are 
mere matters of monetary operation, has had deplorable conse-
quences, since its practical application—besides adversely affecting 
economic development—has diverted attention from the basic solu-
tions which this structural phenomenon demands. 
This is a point of considerable importance for Latin America, 
for unless the solutions in question are resolutely sought, our 
countries will be swept by the force of circumstances towards an 
increasingly closed type of development, and a steady contraction 
of their share in trade with the rest of the world, which will add 
further difficulties to those inherent in such a process. In default 
of sufficient international co-operation in overcoming these diffi-
culties, both in the field of trade and in that of financing, all kinds 
of authoritarian measures might supervene, with grave conse-
quences for the progressive development of democracy in Latin 
America. 
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5. Internal bottlenecks 
The intensification of development is not simply a question of 
increasing net capital formation. While this is necessary, it is by 
no means sufficient, since development may be cramped by a 
variety of factors. Those of an external kind have already been 
mentioned, but there are also internal bottlenecks that circumscribe 
or hamper the expansive force of net capital formation. 
Furthermore, there is usually a wide margin for the immediate 
growth of production in our countries because of idle capacity in 
a number of branches. But the factors in question either rule out 
this possibility or bring inflationary pressures of a non-monetary 
kind in their train if a policy directed towards the full utilization 
of idle capacity is put into force. 
There is no doubt that the most persistent bottleneck in the 
whole of Latin America's development process is generally to be 
found in agricultural production.3 Several factors are jointly 
responsible for this: the system of land tenure, which makes it 
difficult for modern techniques to be assimilated ; inadequate State 
aid in the work of adapting and diffusing these techniques; and 
the unsatisfactory investment situation. However thoroughly these 
three problems are coped with, unless farmers are given proper 
incentives, efforts to accelerate development are liable to find their 
most formidable stumbling-block in the agricultural sector, as has 
been the case in a number of countries with differing economic 
systems. 
The incentives may be of various kinds, but the most im-
portant is that agriculture should reap the benefits of the technical 
progress it makes, as regards both external aspects and the inter-
play of internal economic forces. This is the only way in which the 
wide gap between average income figures in rural and in urban 
areas can be gradually narrowed. The fact is that the impoverished 
half of the population is largely to be found in rural areas. 
With a little thought, it will be seen that the externally-
geared growth of earlier periods, based on the characteristic types 
of foreign enclave which do not spread technical progress to the 
internal economy, broke up the original pre-capitalistic integration 
of the countryside with the towns. And industrialization tends to 
widen rather than reduce the breach by aggravating the social and 
economic dichotomy. Steps must now be taken to remedy this. 
3
 This internal bottleneck—in common with others frequently encoun-
tered in the Latin American development process—has frustrated a number 
of attempts to redistribute income; these have been limited to improving 
the monetary level of wages and salaries, irrespective of the investment 
required to raise production, especially in the agricultural sector, and to 
satisfying the increase produced in popular demand by the redistribution of 
income, without inflationary pressure. 
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The widening of the gap is due not only to the structural 
features of the rural sector, but also to the fact that internal 
development has not been dynamic enough to raise the farmer's 
income. What is more, it is the farmer who is usually called upon 
to bear a considerable part of the cost of import substitution, 
excessive protection and unfair marketing practices, as well as 
social security and other State services from which the rural 
worker reaps virtually no benefit because he can exert no trade-
union pressure and has no political contacts. In fact, he continues 
to play Lazarus to the Dives of urban politics. 
No exhaustive examination has yet been made of all the 
repercussions of these factors on the drift from the countryside to 
the bigger Latin Americans towns, which is a striking and dis-
quieting sign of economic and social disequilibrium. There is no 
doubt that in-migration is bound to take place; nor is there any 
doubt that the increased technical progress of the rural areas will 
tend to give it greater momentum. But is it necessary for the dis-
placed population to congregate in the big towns? Why should 
they not stay in the rural milieu, living in small and medium-
sized communities and employed in industries and services that 
would satisfy some of the requirements of that milieu itself? 
Why have the bigger towns in Latin America grown, at the ex-
pense of the medium-sized and small towns, to an extraordinary 
extent that is quite disproportionate to the trend of events in more 
advanced countries? 
These questions cannot be answered satisfactorily without 
careful research. Perhaps the weakness of rural demand, or, to 
put it another way, the concentration of demand in the big towns 
as a result of the structural4 and adventitious factors mentioned 
above, may have played an important part in this phenomenon. 
And, as in the case of other social phenomena, there have been 
no countervailing reactions, but a self-perpetuating spiral, since 
the agglomeration of people in big towns concentrates demand there 
even more, and this in turn leads to further population congestion. 
It may therefore be concluded that the geographical redistribution 
of income is also of great social importance. 
6. Why should development forces he deliberately controlled? 
One dominant idea runs through the whole of this paper: 
Latin America must quicken its rate of economic development and 
redistribute income in favour of the broad masses of the popula-
4
 With respect to these structural factors, it should be taken into 
account that, because of the system of land tenure in force, much of the 
income from the land—particularly that of the big landowners—is spent 
in the towns and not in the countryside. 
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tion. The attainment of this objective cannot be indefinitely post-
poned, nor are there grounds for expecting that economic develop-
ment will take place first and be followed in the natural course 
of events by social development. Both must be achieved gradually 
and side by side. This will entail rational and deliberate action to 
influence the forces of development; the spontaneous interplay of 
these forces will not suffice here, as it did in the capitalistic evolu-
tion of the advanced countries. 
The notion that this type of evolution might be reproduced 
in Latin America has been very misleading. In the advanced coun-
tries economic development has been essentially a spontaneous 
phenomenon, but the same is not true of social development, which 
has largely been shaped by deliberate policy measures. And it is 
clear that in those countries the need for action of this sort, the 
need for planning, is also gaining recognition. 
There is one overriding argument : today, when man is acquir-
ing a power over the forces of nature hitherto undreamed-of, he 
cannot resign himself to remaining at the mercy of the spontaneous 
play of economic forces, with its manifest incapacity to maintain or 
achieve a satisfactory rate of growth while at the same time 
reducing cyclical fluctuations, and to bring about equitable income 
distribution. 
The impracticability of history's repeating itself in this respect 
makes the reasons for finding new paths particularly cogent. The 
assimilation of an already highly-developed technique in a fairly 
short space of time is a very different matter from the gradual 
development of such a technique, since serious incongruities or 
disparities appear which have to be dealt with by State action. 
First, during the evolution of the capitalist economies, tech-
nology was gradually incorporated into the production process as 
the necessary capital formation took place. The countries now 
developing, on the other hand, have to assimilate a technology that 
is ready-made. And if they are to climb progressively towards the 
higher stage already reached by the more advanced countries, the 
rate of increase of per capita income will have to be more rapid 
in their case than it was in the industrial countries in the past. 
Then too, the technology in question and the continual innova-
tions it entails call for substantial capital per head, which the 
advanced countries can easily build up on the strength of their high 
per capita income. The developing countries, on the other hand, 
in face of the same extremely capital-intensive technology, have 
an average per capita income barely comparable to that of the 
former countries nearly a century ago. Hence there is no way out 
but for the State deliberately to reduce the consumption of the 
higher income groups in the community, whereas there was no 
necessity for this when the capitalist economies were developing, 
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since saving on the part of those same groups was spontaneous 
and almost automatic. 
These two incongruities bring in their train another, to which 
reference has already been made. Whereas in the advanced coun-
tries net capital formation came first and the redistribution of 
income later, in our countries the two problems have now to be 
solved simultaneously, particularly with the model of the Soviet 
method of economic development forever before our eyes. 
To add to this, there is the rapidity with which techniques 
for the prevention and cure of disease are spread, and the ensuing 
sharp drop in the mortality rate, a phenomenon that took place 
very slowly during the evolutionary stage of the more advanced 
countries, and was accompanied by an equally gradual fall in the 
birth rate. There the increase in income fostered changes in the 
psychological attitude to family formation which are not yet in 
evidence among the broad masses of the Latin American popula-
tion with their meagre resources. This explains the disparity be-
tween the exceptionally high rate of population growth in Latin 
America and the relatively moderate rate prevailing during the 
evolution of the capitalist economies. 
The high rate of demographic growth entails a more intensive 
capital formation effort and enhances the incongruity between the 
inexhaustible supply of manpower in our countries and the tech-
nology we must assimilate, as evolved in the big industrial centres 
under the spur of an ever-increasing labour shortage. 
Lastly, mention must be made of the incongruity or disparity 
between import and export demand, which was likewise no problem 
in the past. Thus the big centres, as they grew, did not show that 
trend towards the formation of external bottlenecks which is 
characteristic of the Latin American countries. 
The task of coping with these incongruities and promoting 
development entails three forms of State action. First and fore-
most, action to reform the social structure and thereby remove the 
obstacles to development ; this consists essentially in making full use 
of the savings potential, encouraging the intensive utilization of land 
and capital and freeing the huge potential of individual initiative 
which now goes to waste, so as to give the system its full dynamic 
force. 
These changes in the social structure pave the way for others, 
affecting .the production pattern and structure of the economy, 
which are inherent in the spread and absorption of contemporary 
technology. 
Lastly, State action is indispensable if the marked disparities 
in income distribution are to be progressively remedied by virtue 
of the increase in income accompanying the changes introduced. 
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7. Opposition to reforms and responsibility for carrying them out 
These internal structural changes, and international co-
operation in development, are the subject-matter of the present 
document. It is designed as much for those who resist such changes 
within their own countries as for those who propose to carry them 
out. It is also directed at those outside the region who fail to grasp 
the nature and gravity of events in Latin America. 
To the first of these groups, we should like to demonstrate 
the ineluctable necessity of introducing the changes in question 
into the social structure so that the pattern of production and the 
structure of the economy can respond to development requirements. 
If they are anxious to keep their position in the distribution scale 
inviolate, we would emphasize for their benefit that a point in 
history has been reached when it is no longer feasible to maintain 
consumption patterns that imply the dissipation of a substantial 
capital formation potential, in a fashion totally incompatible with 
the region's vast capital formation requirements. And if they are 
concerned for the future of democracy, it will not be amiss to 
suggest that nothing will do more to strengthen it in Latin America 
than social mobility, the emergence and rise of the dynamic ele-
ments of society, by virtue of the reforms in question; and that 
stubborn opposition to such measures might compel other men, 
whose ultimate motive was the same, to ride roughshod over 
democratic procedure in order to achieve this aim, perhaps in the 
illusory belief that the opportunities for sound democratic devel-
opment which would thus be lost in social strife could be recovered 
in the course of time. 
Those who are resolved to carry out the reforms are faced 
with a tremendous responsibility. Considerable emotional force is 
building up in Latin America, the emotional force of great mass 
movements. It must be channelled towards clear and constructive 
ends. Nothing can be accomplished without thought and rational 
planning. But neither can bold decisions be taken—such decisions 
as our countries need—without the driving-power of this force. 
The acid test of ultimate efficacy will lie in the ability of the 
leaders to fuse these elements into a development policy. 
There is, of course, always the risk that such reforms and the 
necessary follow-up action may be bungled if the primary objec-
tives are lost sight of. There will be no genuine reforms in the 
structure of society if all that happens is that the existing privileges 
change hands or that new privileges and sinecures are added to 
the old. 
Furthermore, it must be understood both in our countries 
and outside them that in all this we are confronted with new 
requirements. In the evolution of the capitalist economies a devel-
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opment policy was not essential, because of the spontaneity of the 
process itself. This type of evolution cannot be repeated in the 
Latin American countries. 
Outside Latin America, naturally enough, it may seem not 
only possible but desirable for the region to follow the path which 
led the developed countries to achieve such impressive results. 
But unfortunately this is often conducive to deplorable attitudes 
of mind, even in'those who are actuated by a genuine desire to 
co-operate, since there are also some who look to international 
co-operation to produce results which have some virtue viewed 
from the political angle, but which, however effective as stop-gaps, 
would be self-defeating over the long run. The only admissible 
political meaning of such co-operation, from the Latin American 
standpoint, is its contribution towards the political viability of an 
intensive internal development effort. 
8. A system of ideas and a changed outlook 
All this presents Latin America with a new set of problems, 
very different from that with which previous generations were 
faced. In the midst of the world depression we did not know the 
true nature of Latin America's development difficulties : the domi-
nant idea was simply to restore normal conditions, to return to the 
past. Fifteen years ago we were already able to attempt to define 
the set of problems in question and to point with deep conviction 
to certain basic solutions. And today sufficient progress has been 
made to work out a system of ideas, a dynamic view of economic 
and social development leading to practical action. Now the task 
is to promote public discussion and above all to gain the ear of 
political and trade-union leaders. What has to be done is to over-
come the ideological poverty that prevails in our countries in this 
field, the traditional propensity to introduce from abroad nostrums 
that are largely alien to the real requirements of Latin America's 
situation. 
If the ideas that we Latin American economists have worked 
out are to serve as a guide to the State in acting on the forces 
of development, they must be presented in a clear and accessible 
form. There is no idea in the development field that cannot be 
explained in simple terms, even though its working-out may have 
required complicated reasoning and mathematical procedures to 
improve the level of thinking—not to reduce the need for it. We 
economists must acquire this ability to make ourselves understood ; 
if we do not succeed, the failure should be attributed to confusion 
on our part rather than to the limitations of others. In fact, if 
our arguments are not concise and clear, this is generally because 
they have not been properly sifted, or because we have not 
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altogether freed ourselves from the frame of mind that looks to 
the esoteric for the material of intellectual prestige. Or perhaps 
confusion results from the play of economic or political interests, 
or from a certain tendency to wrap one's thoughts in vague terms 
in order to shun the responsibility for definite views. 
This, too, involves a new problem. There was no need for 
public discussion of development when it took place of its own 
accord as the capitalist economies evolved; there was no reason 
then to expound the problem of capital formation, since the solution 
came about spontaneously. 
This is undoubtedly the crucial problem of Latin American 
development. Given that very firm measures must be adopted to 
increase the flow of savings, steps must also be taken to ensure 
that the funds thus obtained are in fact used to augment capital, 
and that this capital is devoted to achieving the aims of the de-
velopment plan. 
Here we must watch for an ever-present risk. The social 
tensions of today will not infrequently make for the use of an 
excessively high proportion of such funds to improve present con-
sumption, or to effect social investment for immediate welfare 
purposes, at the expense of economic investment which would 
promote welfare at a later, although not remote, date. To yield to 
this pressure would spell utter failure to attain the social objective 
of achieving a steady and vigorous improvement in the living con-
ditions of the broad masses. 
What is more, military expenditure often absorbs an ap-
preciable proportion of total income, to the detriment of economic 
development. Certain very significant questions arise in this con-
text. Does not the evolution of military technology also call for a 
searching review of the prevailing ideas? And would this involve 
an increase in such expenditure, or might it not be possible, by 
virtue of this technology and the limitation of armaments, to 
reduce the armed forces, at the same time increasing their effec-
tiveness and curtailing military expenditure in favour of economic 
development? 
All these questions open up, for the first time in our countries, 
a very broad field in which public awareness of development can 
be shaped. This does not apply solely to the lofty ideas and grand 
designs that capture the popular imagination. The practical process 
of development also provides very varied opportunities for chan-
nelling the energies of the community into the many specific tasks 
that are part of a development plan. There are visible signs in our 
countries of vast latent wealth of enthusiasm and initiative that 
springs less from personal interest than from a community spirit 
which the women of Latin America too are demonstrating by their 
increasing participation in political and social life. 
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Furthermore, community action, like the co-operative move-
ment, will permit simplification of State action by confining it to 
the efficient manipulation of the machinery of the system, and 
leaving to individuals the tasks that can better be performed by 
them on their own initiative and responsibility, since the State is 
already taking on some very thorny problems as part of develop-
ment planning. Generally speaking it is not equipped to do so in 
the Latin American countries, and in this respect too sweeping 
changes will have to be made if the State is to assume new and 
exacting responsibilities. 
In fact neither structural reforms nor planning can be ap-
proached on the basis of simple formulas that, once crystallized 
in the form of legislation and decrees, will operate automatically, 
by virtue of the mere fact that a plan has been approved and inter-
national funds have been promised. In periods of externally-geared 
development this typical expectation that all problems will some-
how solve themselves is strongly entrenched, and at times it is 
found in the least likely quarters. This has already become a danger 
to planning. 
We must turn aside from such mirages. There is not going 
to be any easy way out for Latin America. Planning means a 
strictly methodical although not a strait-jacket approach to de-
velopment problems, and an unremitting discipline in State action. 
It consists in a series of acts of foresight, of anticipation of future 
needs, of rationally relating the method of meeting those needs to 
the scanty resources available. 
All this shows that the design of influencing the forces of 
development is a vast undertaking in terms both of time and of 
scope. It requires not only changed structures, but also changes 
in outlook, approach, and modes of action. But are such changes 
feasible in our countries? This question often evokes a feeling 
of scepticism that discourages action. But the attempt must be 
made, for there is no other way out. Reliance on the mere play 
of market forces, on foreign private investment and on a "hands-
off" State policy is no solution. 
9. Latin America must find its own paths to development 
Development policy must be based on a correct interpretation 
of the real state of affairs in Latin America. The theories that 
we have taken up, and are still taking up, from the countries at 
the centre of the world economy often make a fallacious claim to 
be generally applicable. It is essentially incumbent on us who are 
on the periphery to play our part in correcting these theories and 
introducing the dynamic elements needed to bring them into line 
with our own situation. 
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The same is true of the practical side of development. The 
uncompromising opposition to the industrialization of our coun-
tries has already been overcome, and we are now successfully 
combating the reluctance to recognize the significance of the 
deterioration in the terms of trade. But we have a long way to 
go—and perhaps even less time to lose—in the field of monetary 
policy, where it is still the practice to impute inflationary leanings 
to those who refuse to admit that inflation is a phenomenon un-
connected with the social structure. 
In the actual planning of development it is obvious that we 
must make our own way. In the most advanced Western countries 
planning experience is being accumulated, but in conditions dif-
ferent from those existing in Latin America. This experience 
must be closely followed, and so must that of the socialist coun-
tries, where planning is of longer standing and is based on direct 
economic action by the State and the political system that would 
appear to be inherent in this. 
In Latin America the propensity to import ideologies is still 
very strong—as strong as the propensity of the central industrial 
countries to export them. This is an obvious legacy from the times 
of externally-geared development. Let us be quite clear; there is 
no question of closing our minds to what is being thought and 
done in other countries. Happily, in the great world centres there 
is a growing interest in development theory and problems, and it 
would be a serious mistake not to take advantage of the valuable 
asistance thus made available to us. But nothing can absolve us 
from the intellectual obligation to analyse our own phenomena 
and to seek our own true image in our endeavour to change the 
existing order. Let us make intelligent use of the thought and 
experience of others, but only as a means of crystallizing our own 
ideas. 
This does not apply to the economic field alone. Our vital 
problem is a much broader one, for we must not lose sight of the 
real object of development or fail to project, in addition, the image 
of what we want the Latin American citizen to become within the 
next few generations. 
The rapid assimilation of technology entails new patterns of 
living and new attitudes of mind. Nevertheless, there is nothing 
in this vast process of change that requires the relegation of human 
values to second place. On the contrary, present-day technology 
opens up infinite possibilities for a variety of ways of life and a 
freedom of individual choice that until recently, in terms of history, 
were confined to a small fraction of mankind. 
But the production technique of today also makes possible an 
enormous concentration of economic power in a few hands, and 
this is perhaps even more true of information techniques and mass 
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communication of ideas. Everything depends on the use we make 
of such techniques for the purpose of exercising conscious and 
deliberate control over the forces of economic and social develop-
ment—on whether we use them to place some men under the 
dominion of others, or to enhance the dignity of the human 
personality. 
10. The concentration of economic power and its political effects 
However, circumstances might well lead Latin America to 
take decisions that are not based on an objective view of such 
arguments. Resistance to the structural reforms postulated in the 
Charter of Punta del Este is all too well known in our countries. 
It may safely be assumed that some of the avowed opposition to 
State intervention is due at times to the simple fact that the prime 
purpose of such intervention is to effect these reforms. Ideological 
beliefs are invoked to dress up a basic opposition rather than 
because they are deeply held. Possibly the authoritarian State, 
and the disintegration of democracy, would not be regarded as 
nearly so distasteful by some critics if they thought that by such 
means it would be possible to achieve their goal—fantastic and 
illusory as this is—of keeping the present structure intact. 
This dissentient note often meets with a response in certain 
circles outside Latin America, where this is only to be expected, 
since the economic and social complex that hampers development 
also includes certain exogenous elements. Thus once more the old 
argument emerges, both at home and abroad : first, we must com-
plete the stage of economic development, and social reforms will 
follow; to speak of them now is to discourage private initiative. 
This is a profoundly mistaken belief. There can be no speed-up 
in economic development without a change in the social structure. 
And it is also a cause of deep concern for those who envisaged the 
Charter of Punta del Este as heralding a new policy of international 
co-operation with those countries that were resolute in undertaking 
such structural reforms. It is easy to understand that certain 
private investments may be held up while there is uncertainty 
as to the issue of the reforms in question. Without attempting to 
establish a strict parallel, it may be pointed out that equal uncer-
tainty prevailed in the countries of Western Europe after the war ; 
but the immediate threat that existed then was banished, not by 
private investment or appeals to repatriate European flight capital, 
but by the superb daring of the Marshall Plan. It was after this 
development that private investment began to flourish and the 
flight capital returned. 
We are living in an epoch that is, and will continue to be, 
decisive, and that calls for a long-term approach. The postpone-
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ment or emasculation of reforms for fear of a temporary dis-
couragement of private investment will not mean that an atmos-
phere favourable to foreign private investment is created. On the 
contrary, it will jeopardize the very existence of private enterprise, 
not to mention the endeavour to give it full dynamic impetus. 
Let us not deceive ourselves. This is not a question that can 
be resolved on a doctrinaire level; it is essentially political. The 
political banner under which Latin American development is 
carried out is not a mere matter of intellectual preference, but 
will depend largely on the actual course of events in the next 
few years. There is a certain element of determinism in these 
events, and the only way to circumvent it is to influence their 
course in anticipation. 
I have already stressed this point in these early pages, and 
there is no need to labour it further. Suffice it to recall the many 
serious difficulties that are attending the trend towards closed 
development. A supreme effort is called for to reverse this trend 
in national, Latin American and international plans, since if this 
is not done, and done in time, the outcome may be the authoritarian 
State, and incentives to economic activity may be superseded by 
compulsion. 
We have spoken of determinism in relation to events; and 
perhaps there is an inexorable logic in their consequences. For 
if development were to become progressively more closed, we 
should also have to withdraw to some extent from the outside 
world, to avoid the contamination of new tastes, new needs or 
new aspirations, and this withdrawal would be interwoven into 
the fabric of an ideology that, on the basis of the same repressive 
machinery, would have to be similarly safeguarded from the harsh 
breath of criticism. 
There are many paths leading to the authoritarian State ; this 
is not the only one. Another is resistance to the structural changes 
that fling wide the gateways for the forces of development. But 
in this case the starting-point is political, not economic, although 
both paths lead to the same destination. If there were unyielding 
opposition, either to the reforms as such or to their execution, 
extremely critical situations might arise. 
And the men who acquire the political power to carry out 
these reforms as the result of a possibly irresistible tide of popular 
feeling, may be forced to concentrate economic power in their 
hands in order that their political power may be strengthened and 
consolidated, and perhaps also to use the whole of the savings 
potential of the community, in face of the magnitude of the prob-
lem confronting them and the contraction of private investment 
—an economic power far exceeding anything the State possessed 
during the evolution of the capitalist economies. 
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The concentration of economic power in any form is always 
a threat to the true spirit of democracy. The State is not an 
abstract and disembodied entity, and those who operate its ma-
chinery are inevitably swayed by interests and passions as well 
as by community aims. It is hardly conceivable that when they 
hold the economic power in their hands, when they have seized it 
under the spur of these interests and pressures, they will refrain 
from subjecting other men to their own will, or that these others 
can be independent in their outlook and decisions if their every 
activity and their very means of existence depend on those in 
power, and any alternative is denied them. 
The basic question lies here, not in planning, since even those 
who hold deep and firm democratic convictions, who believe in 
political freedom and human rights, might find themselves com-
pelled to compromise first of all by the force of circumstance, and 
secondly by the actual logic of events. 
This is certainly not the state of affairs we would wish to 
substitute for the status quo. It would be a tragedy if in order to 
free man from want we had to sacrifice other values and subject 
him to the demands of an arbitrary power. The very idea is funda-
mentally incompatible with the genius of the Latin American 
peoples, with their latent urge to shake off the trammels of poverty 
in order to liberate the human personality and give full rein, by 
means of economic development, to democracy and human rights, 
especially as regards the underprivileged half of the population 
of Latin America; in order to ensure that both there and in all 
strata of society, social mobility will allow the best elements to 
move upwards, for the good of economic development and of 
democracy. The goal must be a social order free from privilege, 
and not only economic privilege, but also that baneful sort 
whereby some men usurp dominion over the ideas of the rest, over 
the creative forces of the spirit and over the deepest feelings of 
the heart. 
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B. INTERNAL STRUCTURAL FACTORS 

Chapter I 
THE DYNAMIC WEAKNESS OF LATIN AMERICA'S 
DEVELOPMENT 
I. PRODUCTIVE ABSORPTION OF MANPOWER 
1. Slow growth rate and surplus manpower 
The very low annual growth rate of 1 per cent registered 
by per capita income in Latin America as a whole since the mid-
fifties is clear proof of the lack of dynamism in Latin America's 
development. Comparison of this rate with the 3.7 per cent attained 
in Western Europe during the last decade, Japan's 8.3 per cent, 
and the annual per capita rates of between 5.3 and 9.0 per cent 
in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, brings home the full 
significance of the fact. At the rate of 1 per cent it would take 
seventy years to double per capita income in Latin America as a 
whole—although there are marked differences between countries.1 
This in itself is very serious. But there is another fact that 
is perhaps an even greater cause of social tension. An appreciable 
proportion of the increase in the active population is not properly 
absorbed in the production process ; economic development passes 
it by. This is mainly true of the population that moves from the 
country areas to the towns. In the country the rate of demographic 
growth is possibly higher than the over-all average of 2.9 per cent 
per annum, but in the last decade those who remained on the land 
represented only about 1.5 per cent. This must inevitably happen 
in the process of economic development, but what is not inevitable 
is the fate of such people. Far from achieving integration in city 
life, and sharing in better patterns of living, they put up their 
wretched shanty towns and eke out a hand-to-mouth existence in 
a whole wide range of ill-paid personal services, with periods of 
out-and-out unemployment. 
Thus poverty, frustration and resentment surge in from the 
country to the towns, where the symptoms of the concentration of 
income are already so conspicuous. This is clear proof of the ex-
plosive social polarization of development, imputable to its dynamic 
weakness and distributional shortcomings. 
1
 See The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-war 
Period (E/CN.12/6S9/Rev.l), op. cit., chapter II. 
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Here there is a twofold phenomenon that needs explaining: 
the displacement of the population from the rural areas to the 
towns, and the unsatisfactory absorption of the migrants. The 
reasons for the displacement are sufficiently well known; demand 
increases more slowly for primary commodities than for industrial 
goods as the general level of per capita demand rises. Recent 
experience in Latin America as a whole indicates that for each 
1 per cent increment in over-all demand, agricultural demand 
increased by only 0.5 per cent, whereas industrial demand did so 
by about 1.4 per cent. 
This fact alone suffices to account for the large-scale drift 
of the active population increment to the towns. But it is not the 
only explanation, for as productivity improves in agriculture and 
in other primary occupations, the displacement must increase 
—other things being equal—and it will also increase in proportion 
to the percentage whereby the natural growth rate of the rural 
population exceeds that of the urban population. 
Not all the redundant manpower comes from agriculture and 
other primary activities. In the towns there is generally a plethora 
of workers with very low incomes : in addition to the unemployed, 
there are all those engaged in unskilled personal services, from 
domestic service to very small-scale street trading, together with 
artisan activities of the pre-capitalistic type. All these people are 
outside the area of technical progress ; but as the labour-absorbing 
activities develop, the increment in the active population and even 
in the population forming these lowest groups tends to move into 
them in search of better pay. 
But what are these labour-absorbing activities ? First, industry 
and allied activities relating to the movement of goods (trade and 
transport), which all tend to grow more rapidly than income, and, 
secondly, other activities that also tend to expand relatively fast 
as income increases, thus accelerating its upward trend; these 
comprise a large range of skilled personal services that require 
varying degrees of vocational training, and government services. 
Industry and related activities play a key role in the dynamic 
development of the labour force. And in order to fulfill this func-
tion of providing employment and stimulating the second group 
of activities to do the same, they must grow at a given pace, which 
cannot be arbitrarily defined. Otherwise, one section of the displaced 
agricultural population will be driven into the underpaid groups in 
the towns, that is, the groups engaged in the various unskilled 
services. Furthermore, those so engaged will find it difficult to 
obtain proper employment in the manpower-absorbing activities 
in so far as the growth rate of those activities is not in proportion 
to the population to be absorbed. 
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Thus there is a minimum rate of development which is essen-
tial if the manpower-absorbing function is to be fully discharged 
And if this pace is not maintained, part of the population dis-
placed from agriculture and other primary occupations—if it does 
not merely remain where it is, marking time—will move to the 
towns to look for work in the unskilled and underpaid personal 
services, or will cover up the fact that it represents superfluous 
manpower by performing unnecessary tasks in public administra-
tion and primary activities. 
But there is yet another point to consider. The people engaged 
in these personal services, who are also trying to move into the 
manpower-absorbing activities, can do so only to a limited extent. 
The result is an uncontrolled mushroom growth of marginal ac-
tivities in the medium-sized and small towns, with the serious 
consequences such a process entails. All this is due to the dynamic 
weakness of the system as it functions at present, and its inability 
to attain the minimum rate of development with a satisfactory rate 
of capital formation.2 
2. Increased productivity and the need jor new investment 
The above considerations enable us to throw some light on a 
very important phenomenon: in view of the dominant role of 
industry and allied activities in absorbing manpower, their growth 
rate must increase proportionately with the improvement in their 
average productivity; and a similar responsibility is imposed on 
them by any increase in productivity in agricultural and other 
primary activities. 
It may be said that the rise in productivity resulting from 
technical progress must also be accompanied by a rise in the 
coefficient of investment. In line with the technique introduced at 
the various stages of the production process, a minimum invest-
ment coefficient and a minimum rate of income growth aTe needed 
if the manpower-absorbing activities are to play their part to the 
full. 
The annual growth of 1 per cent registered for per capita 
income is far below this minimum level, and even the rate of 
2.5 per cent referred to in the Charter of Punta del Este is insuffi-
cient from this standpoint. Consequently it is hardly to be 
wondered at that surplus active population is to be found not only 
in unskilled personal services, but also often in industry itself, and 
in business and transport, or else moves into public administration, 
2
 There are extreme cases in Latin America where capital formation 
will have_ to increase at a virtually impossible rate if this labour-absorbing 
function is to be fulfilled. This points to the need for special measures to 
keep the superfluous rural population in the country areas, and avoid 
mechanization patterns that will aggravate the problem. 
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needlessly swelling the ranks at the expense of efficiency—that is, 
when it does not stay in the rural areas as redundant labour. 
This is not a problem that can be solved piecemeal, and it is 
easy to understand why the trade unions should resist piecemeal 
solutions. Basically, it is pointless to introduce measures to clear 
away the dead wood in employment here or there, let alone to 
make a drive to increase productivity, if there is no corresponding 
increase in the economy's capacity to absorb manpower. On the 
other hand resistance would no longer be justified if the latter 
aim were achieved by means of a strong impetus to economic 
development. 
This surplus manpower bottleneck is a characteristic feature 
of Latin American development. Between 1945 and 1962, when 
the active population increased at an annual rate of 2.6 per cent, 
and employment in production and transport of goods absorbed 
manpower at a rate of 1.9 per cent, employment in services in-
creased at the high annual rate of 5 per cent. In 1945, 21 per cent 
of the active population was employed in services, and this propor-
tion has now increased to 30 per cent. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to make a thorough study of 
the composition of this very heterogeneous group, comprising 
skilled and unskilled services, trade and public administration. 
But the contrast between the growth rates of employment in these 
services and in the production and transport of goods is irrefutable 
proof of the existence of redundant manpower in the former 
category. 
In order to bring out the significance of this, a rough calcula-
tion has been made of the minimum rate of income growth that 
would have permitted employment of this redundant manpower 
in activities connected with the production and transport of goods. 
The point of departure is the arbitrary though not unreasonable 
assumption that services in general did not require an increase in 
employment higher than the 2.6 per cent growth rate of the active 
population ; or, in other words, the 5 per cent growth rate actually 
registered represented an excess annual increase of 2.4 per cent. 
The absorption of this surplus would have required at present 
an available supply of capital for the production and transport of 
goods about 27 per cent above the existing level ; and the average 
annual growth rate of the per capita product in these activities 
would have had to be 3.7 instead of 2.3 per cent. 
It should be noted that this marked rise in the over-all growth 
rate of the product would have been obtained with the same rates 
of increase in productivity in these activities.3 This is of special 
3
 That is, annual rates of 2.6 per cent in agriculture and 2.9 per cent 
in industry, energy and transport. 
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significance from the dynamic standpoint, and it is explained by 
the transfer of manpower away from agriculture, where in 1962 
the product was barely 530 dollars per unit of the active popula-
tion, into those other activities—the production and transport of 
goods—where the average was 1,840 dollars. 
These rates refer only to the production and transport of 
goods. To pass on from these sectors to the Latin American 
economy as a whole, another somewhat arbitrary assumption must 
be adopted, for want of better data, namely, that the output figures 
for services would be maintained despite the fact that absorption 
of manpower would increase at an annual rate of 2.6 per cent 
instead of 5 per cent, or, in other words, that there would be 
an average increase m productivity of 2.0 per cent. 
On this assumption, the per capita growth rate, which aver-
aged 2.2 per cent per year between 1945 and 1962—a period that 
includes a fair proportion of favourable years as regards the 
terms of trade—would have had to be not less than 3.1 per cent 
to absorb the surplus population. 
3. Main causes of dynamic weakness 
What is the explanation of this lack of dynamism? It is 
largely to be found in the disequilibrium between productivity 
and investment to which allusion has just been made. It is true 
that the rise in income deriving from an increase in productivity 
generates greater capacity to save. But the capital needed in order 
to absorb the surplus manpower resulting from this higher produc-
tivity exceeds the savings which could at present be obtained; 
and only with the passage of time will it be possible to achieve 
a proper balance between the increase in capital formation entailed 
by an improvement in productivity and the expanded capacity to 
save which the latter brings in its train. The disequilibrium is thus 
a temporary but highly important phenomenon which will have 
to be combated by means of the restriction of consumption 
wherever this is socially practicable, and with the aid of interna-
tional resources. 
Rightly considered, this disequilibrium, in the guise and 
degree in which it makes itself felt in developing countries, springs 
from the obvious contrast between the technique they have to 
assimilate and their present capacity for capital formation. The 
technique in question, perfected in the great industrial centres, 
is based mainly on the need to save labour by increasing the 
amount of capital per head. In the centres referred to, this presents 
no difficulties, thanks to their high income levels. The same cannot 
be said of developing countries. And as it is inexpedient to revert 
to out-of-date techniques, in an endeavour to adopt those com-
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patible with the existing capacity for capital formation, the only 
alternative open to developing countries is to achieve an exceptional 
increase in that capacity, commensurate with the requirements of 
production technique. 
However, this disequilibrium or disparity is aggravated by 
a number of serious distortions in the production process in Latin 
America. Let us try to describe them briefly. 
While a regression in respect of production techniques is 
certainly not feasible, as has just been remarked, it is none the 
less true that there are possibilities of choosing between higher and 
lower levels of employment of manpower, according to the ratio 
between the cost of labour and the cost of capital, as determined 
by factor prices and by Tates of interest on investment resources.4 
This is a problem that will not solve itself of its own accord, 
although such a possibility is conceivable in the abstract. The 
terms in which it presents itself were described earlier in this 
document, but from another standpoint. Capital formation is in-
sufficient to absorb, at the relatively high level of productivity of 
the labour-absorbing activities, the manpower released by the 
labour-expelling industries whose productivity or income per 
worker is lower. In effecting their investment, entrepreneurs adopt 
the techniques that suit them best in the light of the cost of labour 
and of capital. 
That this investment results, to a greater or lesser degree, 
in a saving of manpower which is thus left without satisfactory 
employment, or in failure to absorb the active population thrown 
out of work by the labour-expelling activities, is a point that 
entrepreneurs do not, of course, take into account in their calcula-
tions. For them the problem begins and ends with their own indi-
vidual case, regardless of the possible effects of their line of action 
on the remainder of the community. 
Strictly speaking, it is conceivable that in a very fluid market 
the ratio between the cost of labour and the cost of capital might 
be such as to ensure optimum employment of manpower—that is, 
a ratio permitting the maximum absorption of human resources 
compatible with the maximum increase in the product. This is what 
accounting prices signify in the evaluation of the economic sound-
4
 These possibilities vary according to the branches of industry con-
cerned, but are never negligible, except perhaps in the extreme case of 
continuous-process activities like the chemical industries. In the textile 
industry, for example, recent ECLA studies have shown that two technical 
alternatives, characterized by differing degrees of automatic control of 
equipment, represented a difference in the product-capital ratio of a little 
over SO per cent (in an integrated cotton mill). That is, the selection of the 
less highly mechanized (but nevertheless up-to-date) technique would enable 
the value added per unit of capital invested in equipment to be approxi-
mately doubled. 
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ness of investment. Not enough progress has yet been made in 
respect of the possibilities for the practical application of this con-
cept, except as regards investment by the State, which can get 
away from the current fallacious notion of what constitutes eco-
nomic expediency. If, for example, a higher rate of interest than 
is paid by the State on the resources it borrows is applied in the 
relevant calculations, certain types of investment which result in a 
saving of manpower become anti-economic, and others involving 
the employment of more labour are found to be economically sound. 
But this procedure is not, of course, applicable in private 
activities, except as a guide to the adoption of measures aimed at 
ensuring economic viability. The possible nature of these measures 
cannot be defined at present with any degree of certainty, for as 
this important aspect of the question does not concern the great 
industrial centres, but the peripheral countries, it has not yet been 
explored as thoroughly as it deserves.5 
Moreover, in the Latin American countries the tendency to 
apply capital in ways that have an unfavourable influence on the 
absorption of manpower is aggravated by the effect on production 
costs of customs protection (especially when carried to excess), 
social security contributions and indirect taxation; whereas in 
many instances tariff surcharges are not payable on the prices of 
imported capital goods, or are relatively low. Another factor that 
helps to foster the tendency in question is the comparatively low 
rate of interest—lower than the current market rate—on certain 
international financing operations; this is a good thing as regards 
the real cost of such operations for the country, but not in its 
effects on entrepreneurs' calculations. 
The asymmetry of protectionist policy—explained in an earlier 
document6—has also contributed to the development of labour-
expelling industries, at the expense of others with a higher labour-
absorbing capacity. Protection implies subsidizing import substitu-
tion industries but not export industries. This has militated against 
the economic soundness of the industrialization process, since 
activities have been developed to serve the domestic market whose 
costs, in relation to the world level, are higher than those of other 
5
 Nor has sufficient progress been made in the study of methods 
whereby a saving in construction materials might be achieved and more 
human labour employed in engineering works—bridges, roads, dams, build-
ings—, which absorb a significant proportion of total investment in Latin 
America. The technical standards applied are generally brought from the 
industrial centres, where the wage-materials ratio is much higher than in 
Latin America. Inter alia, therefore, empirical research is needed to deter-
mine the technical standards best suited to the special conditions prevailing 
in the Latin American region. 
8
 See Economic Development, Planning and International Co-operation 
(E/CN.12/S82/Rev.l), United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.II.G.6. 
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activities that have had no chance to develop, either for the do-
mestic market or for export. For example, from the economic 
standpoint there would seem to have been no good reason to 
encourage, by means of protection, substitution activities with costs 
30 per cent above the international level, if by means of subsidies 
of one kind or another it would have been possible to promote 
export industries in which the differences in costs were not so 
great. 
Yet the asymmetry of protectionist policy has led to the adop-
tion of these anti-economic alternatives. And among the import 
substitution industries thus established there are some whose 
excessively high costs are due to a low capital content and high 
labour content ; whereas among the industries that might have been 
established to produce export commodities besides supplying the 
domestic market, those with a high labour content and low capital 
content would have enjoyed special, although not exclusive, ad-
vantages. 
These adverse effects of asymmetrical protectionism on the 
absorption of manpower would have been produced even if the 
ratio between the cost of labour and the cost of capital had been 
correct. But they have unquestionably been aggravated by the 
distortion of this ratio. Unfortunately, this important aspect of the 
question has not yet been the subject of practical research, nor 
has it been clearly elucidated from the theoretical angle. 
Similar anti-absorbent effects seem to be produced by the wide 
disparities in income distribution. Consumption in the upper strata 
of society is also primarily directed towards the products of indus-
tries that absorb relatively little labour and a great deal of capital, 
whereas the reverse is true for the rest of the population. The 
progressive redistribution of income postulated here will therefore 
be conducive to the absorption of more manpower per unit of 
capital invested. This general effect might acquire particular im-
portance in the case of agriculture. 
Lastly, there is a considerable waste of capital in Latin 
America, owing to the unsatisfactory terms of competition in eco-
nomic activity. The capital invested could have a much higher 
productivity than at present if it were more efficiently utilized. In 
some cases, this intensive utilization of capital—like intensive 
methods of farming—would involve the employment of more man-
power to obtain a higher product per unit of capital (or of land). 
But even if this did not happen, the mere raising of the product-
capital ratio would leave more capital available for the absorption 
of manpower in other activities. 
The serious dynamic weakness in the development of Latin 
America must be combated in several ways at once : first, by more 
intensive capital formation and more efficient utilization of the 
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existing stock of capital; secondly, by the more rational use of 
capital in whatever ways are most advantageous from the stand-
point of the absorption of human potential. In short, the more 
rational application of capital in relation to the different possibili-
ties offered by technology, and the more efficient utilization of 
the existing stock of capital, would redound to the benefit of the 
product-capital ratio, and, in consequence, would correlatively re-
duce the proportion of capital required to secure a specific rate 
of development. This should be particularly borne in mind in rela-
tion to the following section. 
It is not, of course, a question of arbitrarily increasing the 
size of the labour force employed with the available capital, but 
of devising applications which yield the maximum aggregate prod-
uct, for only in this way will the maximum per capita product be 
achieved in the economy as a whole. 
II. CAPITAL FORMATION 
1. The possibility of reducing consumption 
All these measures designed to economize in capital and to 
increase manpower absorption will necessarily take some time to 
put into effect. Yet the problem of lack of dynamism in develop-
ment brooks no further delay. Accordingly, attention must first 
be centred on measures aimed at a swift increase in capital for-
mation, without prejudice to those designed to limit its use. 
It was suggested in part A of this document that consump-
tion on the part of the higher income groups might be reduced as 
a way of achieving this objective. Let us examine this point more 
closely on the basis of the hypothetical figures mentioned in that 
connexion. It must be recalled that these are merely approximate 
figures which give a preliminary notion of the problems but do 
not provide a sound foundation for the adoption of specific meas-
ures, since these require careful study in the light of each country's 
particular conditions. 
As will be remembered, the upper strata, consisting of about 
5 per cent of the Latin American population, are responsible for 
nearly three-tenths of total personal consumption. At the opposite 
end of the social scale, 50 per cent of the population account for 
barely two-tenths of the total. Between these two extremes the 
middle income groups, comprising about 45 per cent of the popula-
tion, represent approximately the remaining 50 per cent of total 
personal consumption.7 
7
 In advanced countries such as the United States and those of Western 
Europe, consumption by the high income groups is not more than nine to 
ten times that of the lower strata. 
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This impressive disproportion in the consumption of the 
groups in question, and in the income transferred abroad for in-
vestment and hoarding, implies an ample savings potential which 
would permit a sharp increase in the rate of development, provided 
other conditions were met at the same time. 
In fact, if consumption by the upper strata were brought 
down to not more than eleven times that of the lower strata, the 
annual per capita income growth rate could be raised from 1 per 
cent to 3 per cent, and if it were only nine times as great, the 
annual per capita rate could rise to 4 per cent. 
What this would mean for the upper income groups is illus-
trated roughly by the following figures. Annual average consump-
tion by a family of five persons in these groups is about 8,000 
dollars. This would be reduced to 5,700 dollars (that is, by 28 per 
cent), if the measure of the disparity decreased to eleven times 
the consumption of the lower strata, or to some 4,600 dollars, if it 
dropped to nine times as much, in accordance with the foregoing 
hypothesis. This gives some idea of the difficulties involved. 
However, the problem of speeding up the rate of develop-
ment would not be solved by this drastic curtailment of consump-
tion and increase in savings; these additional savings must also 
be converted into capital goods. And here we come up against 
another formidable barrier in the Latin American countries. 
The fact of the matter is that in these countries internal 
capacity to produce capital goods and the capacity to import them 
are alike inadequate. At present the coefficient of gross investment 
is about 15.5 per cent (10 per cent net). To achieve a growth rate 
of 3 per cent this coefficient would have to be raised to 20.5 per 
cent, and to 23 per cent in order to obtain a 4 per cent growth 
rate. This means that in the two instances given imports of capital 
goods would have to be increased forthwith by 32 per cent and 
48 per cent, respectively. Such targets are beyond the reach of 
most—if not all—of the countries concerned, in view of the prevail-
ing external bottleneck.8 To this must be added the fact that the 
increase in domestic demand for capital goods as well as for con-
sumer goods in consequence of the rise in income could only be 
partly met by using idle production capacity. In addition it would 
be essential to expand the capacity in question, a process which 
takes time. In the meanwhile, this aspect of demand too would 
have to be met through increased imports. 
Clearly, then, under present conditions, Latin America would 
be unable to accelerate its growth rate without external co-
operation. A temporary inflow of international resources is re-
See in this connexion part C, chapter I, of this document 
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quired until such time as import substitution and increased exports 
permit internal and external use of the additional savings obtained 
through a contraction of consumption. Moreover, these interna-
tional resources would have to be channelled first and foremost 
into investment aimed at achieving the objectives indicated and 
eliminating the causes of the internal bottleneck. 
All this is essential if effective use is to be made of this savings 
potential, and likewise in order to increase it, since most of the 
Latin American countries have production capacity which is not 
utilized because of internal or external bottlenecks. Once these 
are disposed of, income can be increased rapidly with a relatively 
small volume of investment compared with the amount normally 
required ; and this income growth will, in turn, increase the capacity 
to save for future investment. 
2. Initial coercion and incentives to economic activity 
Let us now consider another very important facet of this 
subject. Such a drastic contraction in the consumption, of the 
upper strata can obviously not be achieved unless strong coercive 
measures are applied. How far would these measures be compatible 
with the incentive to individual economic activity? Would they 
not weaken the dynamism of the system, with all the consequences 
this entails, rather than give it the full validity which is so essential ? 
A basic distinction must be made between structural reforms 
and the operation of the economic system. The former can obvi-
ously not be achieved through the mere action of incentives; 
coercive measures are unavoidable. On the other hand, the opera-
tion of the system calls for incentives rather than compulsion, 
both in the interests of its efficiency and for basic political reasons. 
Land tenure provides a good example of this distinction. 
Reform of the structure of land tenure is a major means of cur-
tailing consumption if land is not paid for at its commercial value, 
as will be explained later.9 And if payment is spread over a 
relatively long period, at a low rate of interest, incentives are 
obviously ruled out. On the other hand, the new owners of the 
land will have to be given incentives to induce them to increase 
and improve production, and these incentives will have to be 
essentially economic. To put it differently : contraction of consump-
tion with a view to private or government savings, after the land 
tenure system has been reformed, will have to be the result of 
such incentives rather than of coercive measures. 
This is a far-reaching problem, and its solution is of decisive 
importance. Its significance will be better understood when we 
See section III of the present chapter. 
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come to consider the question of social mobility.10 If the economic 
system is to operate effectively and to function democratically the 
emergence of the dynamic elements in all strata of society and 
their upward economic and social mobility must be promoted; and 
the operation of incentives is of major significance. From among 
these dynamic elements will come the experts, administrators and 
leaders in all branches of economic activity; and their personal 
income must be commensurate with their effective contribution to 
the economic process. There will therefore be disparities in income 
distribution; but these will not be the result of a system of 
privilege, and will, on the whole, be much smaller than those 
prevailing at present. 
They will always have to be reduced to a reasonable degree 
from the social standpoint by means of taxation, but if the savings 
drive places too heavy a burden on these new dynamic groups it 
may jeopardize their contribution to the economic process. 
Moreover, a more rapid rate of development combined with 
income distribution policy will enable the normal effort to increase 
savings—as distinct from the exceptional effort inherent in struc-
tural reforms and essential to the achievement of an increase in 
the rate of development—to be gradually extended to all levels 
of society. In this case, however, it would no longer be a matter 
of curtailing present consumption but ra ther of increasing con-
sumption in all the social strata. Popular saving would then have 
to be stimulated also by means of adequate incentives.11 
10 See part B, chapter II, section I, 1, of this study. 
11
 In this connexion, the following was stated in another report : "The 
loan of investment resources as a means of promoting the eventual formation 
of capital does not have to be confined to enterprises. It may also be extended 
to workers. This may turn out to be one of the most effective means of 
achieving popular capital formation and a question arises in this connexion 
which should be given some consideration. The use of credit for the purchase 
of durable consumer goods has been rapidly gaining ground in the Latin 
American countries. This is clearly a way to afford the broad masses of the 
population access to goods which it would be difficult for them to obtain 
in any other way. But this, in common with inflation, is a grave threat to 
saving practices. Perhaps such practices could be encouraged by credits for 
the purchase of securities by the workers themselves, either in the enterprises 
in which they work or in others. These possibilities should be explored and 
the organizations that finance development might play a very important part 
in this respect. 
Loans for capital investment have so far been made direct to enterprises. 
A substantial part could be made indirectly, i.e., through loans to workers 
for the purchase of securities. Reference has just been made above to the 
need for international credit institutions to devote a large part of their 
operations in Latin America to encouraging initiative on the part of firms 
and concerns in the area. These operations could be co-ordinated, in one way 
or another, with the growing participation of workers in the capital forma-
tion process. 
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This is actually a very serious argument in favour of a 
maximum initial effort to encourage savings. For if this effort 
were limited to achievement of an annual per capita growth rate 
target of 3 per cent, the possibility of offering incentives would 
be less than if a rate of 4 per cent or more were attained. 
In fact, all that the 3 per cent rate could achieve would be a 
relatively rapid improvement in consumption by the lower strata, 
i.e., the underprivileged half of the, Latin American population. 
With the help of an adequate income redistribution policy, con-
sumption by this sector could be increased at an annual rate of 
4.2 per cent and thus doubled in seventeen years. In the middle 
strata improvement would be somewhat slower, and in the upper 
strata extremely slow.12 On the other hand, a growth rate of 4 per 
cent or more would lead to more rapid improvement not only 
for the lower strata but for the middle and upper strata as well. 
This is very important, inasmuch as the dynamic elements in the 
upper strata would be able to overcome the initial curtailment of 
their consumption caused by structural reforms, and the new 
dynamic elements moving up from the bottom would have much 
stronger incentives to reach the top. 
Needless to say, this discussion of time schedules must not 
be taken as a proposal for a plan to accelerate development. Our 
purpose is merely to shed light on the nature of the phenomena 
and their possible magnitude in terms of time and effort. Accelera-
tion of the rate of development is a complex operation requiring 
thorough preparation designed to achieve, as a first step, the 
removal of the internal and external obstacles in its way. 
3. The population problem 
One final observation. Throughout this document the popula-
tion growth rate is considered to be one of the basic data as far 
as the development problem is concerned. The impressive increase 
_ The Latin American countries regularly face a very serious problem of 
capital formation in their public services. The use of international assistance 
for the purchase of securities in these services could have very important 
repercussions on the accumulation of capital and on the management of the 
enterprise. The participation of the producers and users of such services 
could provide a new way out of the common dilemma of choosing between 
foreign ownership and management by the State." 
(See Economic Development, Planning and International Co-operation, 
op. cit., p. 11.) 
12
 Contraction of consumption by the 5 per cent of the population in the 
upper income groups would amount to about 14 per cent. Half the popula-
tion would double its per capita consumption in the stated period of seventeen 
years, and the middle strata (45 per cent of the population) would do so in 
twenty-two years. The upper strata, once their consumption had been re-
duced, would increase it again at the very slow rate mentioned in the text. 
35 
in this rate has undoubtedly added considerably to the complexity 
of the problem. A lower rate of population growth could do much 
to smooth the path for the acceleration of development. Of the 
net investment coefficient of 10 per cent of income (gross coef-
ficient 1S.5 per cent) only one-fourth can be applied for the pur-
pose of increasing per capita productivity and income. The remain-
ing three-fourths are needed to keep pace with population growth. 
For example, if the population had continued to increase at a rate 
of 1.8 per cent, as it did at the beginning of the century, the 
present volume of investment would have produced a 2.2 per cent 
increase in per capita income, instead of the 1 per cent registered 
on an average over the past few years. It is not suggested that 
this could be an alternative to full use of the savings potential; 
but it would be an additional means of accelerating growth. How-
ever, we shall not go into this delicate matter in the present docu-
ment, since factors come into play which touch deep-seated feelings 
of the Latin American peoples, and it is not for the economist, as 
such, to suggest appropriate solutions. 
III . T H E LAND: AN OBSTACLE TO DEVELOPMENT 
1. The growth of agricultural production in the past, and future 
requirements 
An annual growth rate of 3 per cent for per capita income 
would call for a considerable effort on the part of Latin American 
agricultural production, much greater than in the past. Hitherto, 
the effort made has been appreciable but not adequate. In the twenty 
years just ended agricultural production expanded by 80 per cent 
(2.6 per cent annually), that is, at a higher rate than in other 
regions of the world, as pointed out in another report.13 Never-
theless, if population growth is taken into account, the per capita 
production increment barely amounted to 0.2 per cent annually, a 
negligible proportion exceeded in the other regions of the world 
where demographic growth is much slower than in Latin America. 
Moreover, this annual rate of growth of 2.6 per cent for 
aggregate production was well below that of consumption, which 
increased at a rate of 3.7 per cent. The deficiency in production 
was made up mainly by reducing exports and expanding agricul-
tural imports from the rest of the world. These imports constitute 
a relatively small percentage of total consumption; nevertheless, 
they add up to a very considerable sum, i.e., about 450 million 
dollars' worth of items which, given a rational production policy 
and reciprocal trade, could be largely obtained in Latin America 
itself. 
wSee Agriculture in Latin America: Problems and Prospects (E/ 
CN.12/686). 
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Admittedly, this imbalance between production and consumption 
is mainly attributable to Argentina, where the substantial increase 
in domestic requirements had to be covered at the expense of 
exports, because of the scant technical progress made by agri-
culture.14 But, even if this country is excluded from the Latin 
American total, production obviously fell short of requirements, 
since it expanded by only 3.2 per cent, while consumption rose 
by 4.2 per cent annually. 
If a minimum annual development rate of 3 per cent per 
capita were achieved, and if, in addition, a resolute policy of income 
redistribution were put into force, the growth of production would 
have to be much faster than before, and faster still if it were 
hoped to slow down the rate at which agricultural imports are 
increasing and so contribute to the removal of the external bottle-
neck. In such circumstances, it has been estimated that over-all 
consumption of agricultural commodities will have to increase at 
a rate of 4.6 per cent annually and production by 4.2 per cent. 
This means that in the next twenty years production should ex-
pand slightly more than 130 per cent, i.e., by considerably more 
than the increment of 80 per cent recorded over the previous 
twenty years. The point is that exports are expected to lag behind 
production in rate of growth (2.5 as against 4.2 per cent), thereby 
enabling consumption to increase more intensively than production 
(by 4.6 per cent). 
Such, then, is the magnitude of the problem that Latin 
America will have to deal with if it hopes to achieve the objec-
tives of development and income redistribution. Everything points 
to the fact that the achievement of an increase in production on 
this scale will have to be based mainly on an improvement in the 
yield from land and not on an extension of the cultivated area as 
hitherto. Past trends will have to be reversed. A review of twenty-
four staple agricultural commodities shows that the 60 per cent 
increment in output during the last twenty years was obtained 
by enlarging the cultivated area by 38 per cent and yields by only 
16 per cent, i.e., at an annual rate of 0.7 per cent.19 
2. The inescapable need to raise yields 
It would not be easy to pursue the trend towards extension of 
the area farmed, first, because the amount of land that is readily 
accessible has been gradually diminishing and, secondly, because 
of the vast investment entailed by the incorporation of new land 
** In the rest of Latin America there was an increase in exports, 
especially in respect of coffee, cotton, sugar and bananas. 
16
 These commodities took up approximately 50 per cent of the total 
cultivated area. 
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and its preparation for productive farming. Then, again, it might 
be asked why this should be done if there are such good prospects 
of increasing the yield of the land already in use. To judge by 
the experience of other countries, it would not be unduly optimistic 
to estimate that, provided a valiant effort is made, yield in the 
next twenty years could be raised by 60 per cent, i.e., at an annual 
rate of 2.4 per cent. If this were done, the cultivated area would 
have to be enlarged by 35 per cent to meet the production target 
specified, i.e., by about 35 million hectares. 
Putting the accent on improved yield is also the course dic-
tated by social considerations, since this is the only way to raise 
the extremely low level of living of the rural population. Land 
reform is, of course, indispensable, but the redistribution of income 
that might be achieved thereby would not be enough in itself to 
solve this particular problem satisfactorily, just as it would also 
fail to solve the problems of the economy as a whole. 
None the less, the social objective that higher yield would thus 
promote could not be attained irrespective of the development rate, 
since agriculture and the other sectors of the economy are closely 
interdependent. It will be recalled that the annual rate of increase 
of 4.2 per cent in agricultural production was estimated in relation 
to an annual income growth rate of 3 per cent and a level of 
demand for agricultural commodities that was in line with the 
relative intensity of growth of internal and external consumption. 
Now, if this rate of growth could not be attained or if con-
sumption were to expand less vigorously, there would be a decline 
in the ratio of the prices of agricultural commodities to those of 
other products, and the agricultural sector would lose all or part 
of the fruits of its technical progress, which would go to benefit 
the rest of the economy instead. In such an event, the displaced 
agricultural population would be unable to find satisfactory em-
ployment in the manpower-absorbing activities, and this would 
tend to aggravate the situation of the marginal urban population. 
Again, if unit yield were to improve more than is expected, and 
the levels of production envisaged could be attained with less 
addition to the cultivated area, there would be a bigger rural sur-
plus that could not be properly absorbed without an adequate in-
crease in the economy's over-all rate of growth. 
This point is extremely important as far as the mechanization 
of agriculture is concerned. If capital is invested to mechanize 
farming and cut down on labour, and if the workers thus displaced 
are unable to find employment in the labour-absorbing activities, 
the investment will have been wasted, that is, the meagre capital 
of the community will have been thrown away. As has already 
been said, this adverse consequence is not incompatible with the 
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personal interests of the entrepreneur, which lead him to aim at 
mechanization without any thought for the social implications of 
what he is doing. 
Thus, the choice of methods of increasing agricultural produc-
tivity should not be left solely to the whim of private interests 
when there is not enough capacity to absorb displaced labour, as 
is the case in Latin America. Preference should therefore be given 
to those methods of introducing modern techniques that raise 
productivity by increasing the yield from the land rather than by 
labour-saving investment. 
The only difficulty is that this requires prior technological 
research, together with the dissemination of its findings, which 
would not be needed in the same way in the case of mechanization ; 
in other words, preliminary groundwork by the State is called 
for. 
It should be noted that the projection in question is simply 
a rational presentation of the scale of these development phenomena, 
and does not represent the choice of a particular alternative, which 
would be arbitrary in the absence of a thorough analysis of each 
country's situation and possibilities. 
3. Dynamic significance of agrarian reform 
This quantitative approach enables the burning topic of 
agrarian reform to be looked at from the angle of dynamic de-
velopment. Reform is urgently needed for three main reasons: 
(a) to bring about structural changes such as would enable the 
savings potential to be used to the full and promote social mobility, 
with its important economic, social and political consequences; 
(b) to satisfy the demand of a rapidly increasing population that 
needs to improve its diet; and (c) to raise the level of living of 
the rural population. 
The last two aims can be achieved solely through an increase 
in agricultural productivity. Land redistribution alone, unaccom-
panied by a rise in productivity, might ease social tension in rural 
areas, but only ephemerally, since, however the land is redistri-
buted, little improvement can be effected with an average product 
per actively employed person of about 500 dollars a year, includ-
ing the landowner's income. True, a reform of the land tenure 
system implies an extremely important social consequence in that 
it liberates forces that are now held in check in the rural areas. 
But this might be a source of new tensions unless the changes went 
hand in hand with a rapid increase in productivity and income. 
This should on no account be taken to mean that such con-
siderations counsel slow progress. The terms of the agrarian 
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reform, which will not be the same in all countries or even in every 
part of a single country, must of course be accurately defined, and 
the appropriate solution decided upon in each case. Similarly, the 
key personnel will have to be trained. But once all this has been 
accomplished—and without unnecessary delay—reform will have 
to be swift and extensive, not only to alleviate the social tension 
in the rural areas but for other reasons as well. There must be 
a large-scale mobilization of economic and social forces, which 
cannot be brought about unless the reform is radical. Such mobili-
zation is essential, since although the role of the State is certainly 
of decisive importance, it is equally true that the community spirit 
of the people and their willingness to co-operate must be stimulated 
and turned to account, both in the rural areas and elsewhere, to 
ensure that State action is prompt and effective. Reform calls for 
the enthusiastic support of the community, which must be directed 
into constructive channels. 
Only by launching the reform wholesale can we learn how 
to carry it out. It is impossible to foresee all the complications that 
will arise or to avert many of the mistakes that may be made. 
What is essential is to have a properly thought-out plan for reform 
and to avail ourselves of the lessons of experience in order to 
rectify such mistakes with flexibility. 
Even though land redistribution—whether effected directly or 
through taxation—is essential for the introduction of modern tech-
niques in rural areas, it is far from being enough. State action is 
also indispensable, as well as incentives to farmers to adopt the 
new techniques. 
4. Technical action by the State 
There is no more serious symptom of the anachronistic out-
look of the Latin American public sector and of its inability to 
meet the demands of economic development than its virtually com-
plete neglect of agricultural research, of the dissemination of the 
findings obtained and of the basic education and technical training 
of the rural population, except in a few outstanding cases. These 
technical tasks could not have been accomplished by individual 
effort alone. The impressive technical progress of United States 
agriculture has been the product of an undeniably effective com-
bination: (a) the "socialization" of technology and (b) the provi-
sion of incentives to individuals to apply it. Technology was 
"socialized" in the sense that it was not private enterprise actuated 
by the profit motive that brought technical progress, but the action 
of the State and the universities, inspired by the desire to help 
the community. To this were added incentives to individual initia-
tive in the shape of technical facilities, investment resources and 
protection of the agricultural terms of trade. What made it possible 
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to do all this with an eye to the needs of the community were two 
salient factors: a farsighted land tenure policy and the constant 
absorption of rural labour into urban activities. Without these, all 
that technical progress could have done would have been simply 
to augment the income from the land but not the income of the 
whole of the agricultural population. 
Once the problem of tenure has been resolved, the inevitable 
complement to technical action by the State is the provision of 
incentives for farmers. Under the prevailing system of land tenure, 
the incentive of higher prices generally succeeded in expanding 
production when the necessary land was available. But when there 
was no land, or it was difficult to come by, the price incentive 
usually changed the composition if not the volume of over-all pro-
duction, and, in the last analysis, increased the income from the 
land with the regressive distribution implied by such a situation. 
The increase of yield through the use of new production tech-
niques—new, that is, for Latin America—can be achieved only if 
these techniques are made accessible by State action and if land-
owners are disposed to make the extra effort entailed. This is often 
incompatible with the way of life of the big landowners, whose 
huge incomes relieve them of the need to adopt new patterns of 
living in order to introduce techniques for raising yield. This ex-
plains why so few attempts have been made under the existing 
land tenure system, even in cases where the State has fulfilled its 
responsibilities on the technical side. 
5. Incentives to agricultural production 
Furthermore, it cannot be said that incentives to the agricul-
tural producer have been a matter of general or lasting concern in 
our countries. This is a most important point in relation to the 
success of agrarian reform, and should be touched upon, even if 
briefly. 
There have actually been a number of factors that have ad-
versely affected incentives to agricultural development. These fac-
tors have their origin in urban activities, and relate mainly to 
relative prices, the distribution costs of agricultural products, and 
incentives to investment in agriculture. 
A factor that has often tended to cause a deterioration in the 
internal terms of trade is an increase in the prices of manufactured 
goods and services consumed by the rural population, due to im-
port substitution and excessive protectionism. To this must be 
added the cost of social welfare benefits and other State services 
not absorbed by an increase in urban productivity and therefore 
to some extent passed on to the prices of goods and services re-
quired in rural areas. These benefits and services are generally 
41 
confined to urban activities, and have been extended to rural ac-
tivities either not at all or to a lesser degree. 
There also seems to have been a relative rise in the cost of mar-
keting agricultural products, both because the increase in real income 
was greater in these activities than in agriculture, and because of 
the all too well-known defects in the organization of marketing. 
Much the same applies to the transport of agricultural commodities, 
and the situation has perhaps been aggravated by the urbanization 
process. 
Lastly, the high profits resulting from excessive tariff protec-
tion, investment in the splitting-up of urban property and in build-
ing, and other types of speculative investment, have helped to 
divert from agriculture investment funds originating in that sector, 
to the detriment of its technical progress. Unfortunately, the lack 
of research on these and other aspects of Latin American agri-
culture makes it impossible to determine how and to what extent 
such factors have operated, and whether or not they have been 
offset by contrary forces. 
It may occasionally have happened that a vigorous increase 
in demand for agricultural commodities has boosted prices suf-
ficiently for these factors' adverse effects on agriculture to be 
counteracted or even completely overcome. There have apparently 
been cases in which the buoyancy of demand has made it possible 
to retransfer to the urban consumer the impact of unfavourable 
relative prices, so that it has been cushioned or even warded off 
altogether as the agricultural terms of trade have improved. Tariff 
protection of some agricultural commodities, and the relative 
shortage of land with which to expand production, must have 
facilitated this movement. 
In other instances this transfer of adverse effects has been 
prevented by imports or price controls.16 In these cases.—by no 
means infrequent—incentives to increase, or even maintain, the 
volume of production have been weakened or removed. 
Over-valuation of the currency has had similar effects by 
preventing agricultural prices from rising to keep up with domestic 
inflation or to counteract an adverse movement of the internal 
terms of trade. Over-valuation is widely recognized as having 
affected not only products for domestic consumption but also ex-
port commodities. In some cases this has resulted in serious dis-
couragement of production, especially when an unfavourable trend 
16
 In this connexion attention should be drawn to the unfavourable situa-
tion of certain essential agricultural commodities—milk, wheat, rice, etc.— 
which in many countries are subject to the fixing of ceiling prices as a 
political measure. The aim of favouring the consumer is laudable; but the 
result is a serious disincentive for the producer. 
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in internal relative prices has been combined with a deterioration 
of the external terms of trade. 
6. Over-valuation oj land and agrarian reform 
All this relates not only to the agricultural development policy 
that accompanies agrarian reform, but also to the nature of the 
reform itself. It is often true in Latin America that the economic 
yield of land is comparatively low in relation to its market value. 
First, the above-mentioned adverse factors have tended to depress 
this yield, and secondly inflation has contributed to the over-
valuation of land for reasons that are well known, including the 
desire to lessen or evade the tax burden by land purchases. This 
is, of course, the type of buying that hinders technical progress 
rather than promoting it. 
When land is thus over-valued, to transfer it at the inflated 
values in the process of agrarian reform would mean that the new 
owners—whether individuals or co-operatives—would be saddled 
with a heavy burden, much more difficult to carry than in the 
case of large properties, precisely because of the amount of income 
derived from these. Hence the desirability of fixing the value of the 
land on the basis of its current yield and establishing long pay-
ment terms and moderate rates of interest.17 Otherwise there might 
be an appreciable weakening of the new owners' incentive to in-
crease productivity, which would endanger the success of the 
agrarian reform. This is a crucial point, for all the Teasons given 
above. And to encourage technical progress it might be advisable 
to combine the purchase of land at a value representing its current 
yield with a tax on the potential value of the redistributed land. 
This potential value could be determined in relation to the improve-
ment in productivity that could be achieved with relatively simple 
techniques, while periodic readjustments could be made to stimulate 
further progress. 
Without the vigorous introduction of more advanced agricul-
tural techniques, the social objective of agrarian reform, namely, 
to provide a means of steadily improving the lot of the rural popula-
tion, would be a mirage, just as it would be idle to suppose that 
the aim of this great structural metamorphosis was to improve the 
level of living of the urban population, by providing them with 
cheaper food. 
w Moreover, a low rate of interest is necessary for the harnessing of 
the savings potential, either by the State or by the new owners, as explained 
in section II of the present chapter. 
43 
Chapter II 
THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM AND THE 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
I. DISTRIBUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AND THE EFFICACY OF THE SYSTEM 
1. Social mobility and the dynamic elements 
The changes in the production pattern and structure of the 
economy that are called for by the spread of modern technology 
entail, in their turn, a transformation of the social structure in 
order to impart dynamic force to the economic system and promote 
income redistribution. Under the prevailing social structure a 
large proportion of the savings potential of the upper income 
groups is left untapped, together with much of the potential em-
bodied in human, land and capital resources. 
During the period of externally-geared development, tech-
nology made little headway. It gained most ground in export ac-
tivities and in the activities allied to them in one way or another. 
The techniques introduced were usually simple, and compatible 
with a social structure based on land monopolization and extensive 
farming methods. Complex techniques were also introduced from 
time to time, but in those cases the activities involved were far 
from being an integral part of Latin American life, since they 
generally constituted foreign enclaves, particularly in so far as the 
exploitation of natural resources was concerned. 
The industrialization movement had no radical effect upon 
this state of affairs. Another upper stratum was added to the 
existing structure and the middle class was gradually drawn into 
it, becoming numerically stronger in the process, but failing to 
establish a definite personality of its own. 
During the first stage of industrialization there was actually 
no need for changes to be made in the social structure. The kind 
of industrialization that took place was mainly extensive, charac-
terized by fairly easy techniques and the lack of any imperative 
need to make intensive use of the scanty capital and of the human 
resources available; in this it resembled the extensive type of 
farming indulged in on large estates. 
The possibilities of this type of development are nearly ex-
hausted. In order to quicken its tempo modern techniques must 
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be introduced into agriculture and yield substantially raised. In-
dustry will have to advance towards increasingly complex patterns, 
explore the possibilities of finding the markets it needs abroad 
and rapidly conquer the vast area within the region where under-
consumption is rife. 
Why is it necessary to transform the social structure if this 
new stage of accelerated development is to supervene? There are 
cogent reasons. The social structure has an adverse effect on de-
velopment in two respects that are of supreme importance: (a) the 
emergence of the dynamic elements in a given society; and (ft) the 
way in which these elements play their part in the production 
process. 
Modern production techniques have an ever-increasing need 
of these dynamic elements, men of initiative, drive and resolution 
who are capable of taking risks and shouldering responsibility. 
They are needed at a vast number of levels, ranging from skilled 
workers to top-level technical experts and the organizers and ad-
ministrators of all the phases of the economic process. They are 
also required in other branches of human activity. The need for 
these dynamic elements increases at a rate far more rapid than that 
of development itself. In other words, if development is speeded 
up, the task of singling out and training such men will have to be 
pursued much more vigorously. In industry alone, it has been 
calculated that for every one per cent by which production in-
creases, there will have to be four per cent1 more technicians in 
every category to ensure production efficiency. The same is true 
of other branches of economic activity. 
What is being done in this connexion in Latin America is 
little enough if the magnitude of the problem and the marked 
differences between the Latin American countries are taken into 
account. A considerable human potential is left untapped, since 
very few dynamic elements succeed in forcing their way up from 
the lower and middle strata of society. Naturally, a larger propor-
tion comes from the middle strata, although there are often serious 
obstacles in the way of their absorption. The lack of proper social 
mobility is clear evidence of social stratification. 
The starting-point for social mobility is education. By now it 
is fully recognized that education in Latin America has fundamental 
shortcomings, that there is a high illiteracy rate and that the edu-
cational system bears no relation to the requirements of economic 
development, quite apart from the serious deficiencies that exist 
in other basic cultural respects. 
1
 See F. H. Harbison, The Process of Educational Planning, Informa-
tion document No. S, Conference on Education and Economic and Social 
Development in Latin America, March 1962. 
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But this is not all. Strictly speaking, the extremely low income 
level of half the population and the straitened circumstances of 
much of the remainder prevent the dynamic elements from emerg-
ing and taking advantage of the whole range of opportunities for 
education and technical training, even when these exist. The first 
concrete expression of an income redistribution policy should be 
in this field, through social investment in the development and 
training of human resources and in the provision of effective means 
of access to education at all levels. This would bring about a new 
order of things in which the dynamic elements that reach the 
upper strata would be proportionate to the numerical size of the 
social strata from which they come. Perhaps one of the most 
decisive factors in the remarkable development first of the United 
States and then of the Soviet Union—despite the fundamental 
divergencies in their systems—has been the common denominator 
of a highly active process of social mobility which had not been 
observable previously under the aegis of industrialization. 
These dynamic elements are not confined exclusively to the 
economic field, but pertain to society as a whole. They are the men 
who set their stamp on each generation. Although their opportuni-
ties for education and for rising in the social scale are severely 
limited, this does not diminish their elan vital or the strength of 
their aspirations. And if the sluggish pace of development prevents 
their being turned to account in the economic and social process 
and hampers their ascent to the different levels of activity within 
this process, there is a natural feeling of resentment, and their 
pent-up energy will inevitably brim over into other channels. What 
course these dynamic elements will eventually follow if the slow 
rate of development persists is another of the unknown quantities 
in Latin America, and herein lies one more great opportunity for 
exercising rational control over the forces of economic and social 
development. 
2. Privilege and its effects on incentives to economic activity 
Nevertheless, the mere fact of bringing these dynamic elements 
to the fore and giving them training does not necessarily mean that 
they will effectually fulfil their function in the economic and social 
development process. At this point we are confronted with the 
other outstanding problem linked to the social structure. In the 
Latin American countries certain forms of privilege are rife which 
considerably weaken the incentive to technical progress in all its 
manifestations, and, consequently, the chances of getting the best 
out of the men of initiative and ability that modern technology 
requires. 
It is common knowledge that the extreme disparities in the 
size of landed properties militate against the application of up-to-
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date intensive farming techniques—in the case of the latifundia, 
because they yield a lucrative income without the introduction of 
such practices, and in that of the minifundia, on account of their 
very poverty and ineffectiveness. 
But this state of affairs is not confined to the land. In industry, 
too, the edge of the incentives to technical progress has been 
blunted by excessive protection and the positions of privilege it 
creates. Private enterprise needs constant application of the spur 
of competition to keep it on the alert. And in Latin American 
industry as a whole, competition is seldom very keen. Here we are 
treading on delicate ground, where—to forestall misinterpreta-
tions^ —a clear line of demarcation must be drawn between criticism 
of the operation of the system and fair acknowledgement of what 
industrialization has achieved. 
The role of private enterprise is not only to establish new 
industries and expand those already in existence, but also to turn 
the limited capital available to the best possible account. This is 
essentially a matter of having the right men to call on. Protection 
carried to excess affords no encouragement to train efficient 
workers and make good use of their services. Production equip-
ment is often misguidedly used, with the result that its performance 
is inferior to that registered even in countries with medium indus-
trial yields, not to mention those where productivity is high. 
Several factors combine to determine this situation : the organiza-
tion of the factory and the system of distribution of labour, defec-
tive raw materials, inadequate supervision, careless treatment of 
machinery and plant. All these problems can be solved. That is, 
they can be solved provided private enterprise does not confine 
its efforts to the initial functions of promotion. It must also be 
indefatigable in its endeavours to increase yields and reduce costs. 
And this is where nothing can replace the spur of competition. 
In the shelter of high tariff barriers and other import restric-
tions or prohibitions, anti-competitive practices, if not virtually 
monopolistic combines, have become widespread. Well-equipped 
establishments operate alongside others whose costs are high, in 
a sort of tacit mutual benefit society, the latter safeguarding their 
marginal existence and the former reaping the big profits that 
accrue from the cost differential. 
Of the need for income redistribution measures to redress the 
existing grave social disparities, no further evidence is required 
than has already been submitted elsewhere in the present docu-
ment.2 But such measures do not represent a complete and basic 
solution, since the disparities in question, and the forms they 
assume, are largely the outcome of the defective operation of the 
8
 See particularly part A, section 2, and part B, chapter I, section II. 
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economic system; there is no close relation between personal 
income and the real contribution made by its recipients to the 
economic and social development process. 
This defective pattern of distribution does not, of course, en-
hance the prestige of the system of private enterprise in the Latin 
American countries, despite the fact that in each of them many 
cases are observable in which a high income level is clearly the 
result of technical progress and of ability to innovate, to introduce 
new methods, to give better service to the community. It is men 
with just such capabilities that are needed for the acceleration of 
development. By virtue of social mobility and competition, increas-
ing numbers of them must be given the opportunity to rise from 
the ranks and receive the necessary training. 
In discussion of such topics, the relation between these two 
decisive factors in economic progress is often forgotten. Free enter-
prise and competition are inseverably linked, since in default 
of the latter the former is doomed to wilt in the atmosphere of 
privilege. Given a combination of the two, there will be abundant 
scope for private enterprise and its energetic participation in the 
planning of development. 
Reflection will show that the ability of a small number of 
people to concentrate in their hands a high proportion of collective 
income has its roots deep in history. Our ancestors failed to do 
what other equally new or even newer societies did to clear the 
way for economic development and stabilize the foundations of 
democracy—namely, abolish privilege in respect of land ownership. 
In these latitudes, the great fortunes of the past derived largely 
from appropriation of the land and its subsequent rise in value. 
To this was later added the further privilege created by excessive 
protection. And at all stages, there has been inflation as a power-
ful instrument for the arbitrary acquisition of wealth. 
No attempt is made here to analyse all the factors that have 
conduced to the concentration of wealth and income, since in that 
case attention would have to be devoted to the consequences of the 
misuse of political power or of certain types of artificial State 
intervention in economic activity, as well as to the effects of 
restrictive business combines and certain harmful practices fos-
tered by defective organization or supervision of the banking sys-
tem. Only the principal determinants are indicated, the most 
widespread, whose significant influence on income distribution and 
the efficacy of the economic system is giving rise to serious 
manifestations of social strife. 
All these forms of privilege in the distribution of wealth and 
income are sapping the energies of the dynamic elements in process 
of emergence, undermining their capacity for struggle and achieve-
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ment. Of those who are prevented from becoming an active part 
of the economic system, by its lack of dynamism, some are driven 
by their very sense of frustration, and the contrast between their 
own situation and that of the more fortunate, into the resentful 
attitude of which something ¡has already been said; while others, 
especially those from the middle strata of society, seek refuge in 
public administration, a field of activity that is as apt to demoralize 
the dynamic elements as to attract those that are not dynamic, those 
that have been unable to find a niche in private economic activity, 
either because of the latter's own shortcomings, or because the 
aforesaid divorce between education and development has dis-
qualified them to do so. 
In such circumstances, functions and functionaries spread and 
multiply in the civil and military spheres. And the State, whether 
prompted by essential considerations or not, takes on entre-
preneurial activities and indulges in different forms of interven-
tion or control which—dictated as they are by the wish to remedy 
deficiencies in the system—seldom deal with development phe-
nomena, much less promote development, since they are frequently 
of a negative or interdictory character. 
Thus, alongside men who discharge their functions with effi-
ciency and public spirit, there are many who take shelter behind 
these other forms of privilege incorporated in the social structure. 
The latter tend to assimilate the living patterns of the ruling 
groups and to rely on their patronage, thus wasting the reforming 
power they might have wielded at their own social level.8 
These social phenomena emanate essentially from the lack of 
dynamism of the development process and at the same time tend 
to aggravate it, not only because State action is diverted into the 
channels indicated above, but also because the dynamic elements 
are devitalized, and net capital formation is thus deprived of sub-
stantial resources. 
II. INFLATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
1. The social background of inflation 
The power of certain social groups to exercise an arbitrary 
influence over the distribution of income is what lies behind infla-
tion in Latin America. It gives rise to factors that have a direct 
or indirect inflationary impact. This impact b direct, if recourse is 
had to credit expansion as a means of meeting investment require-
ments, instead of to the restriction of consumption, or if the neces-
sary effort to meet the government deficit by taxation or budgetary 
8
 See José Medina Echavarria, Economic Development in Latín 
America. Sociological Considerations (E/CN. 12/646). 
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means is shirked, either in boom periods, when this effort is rela-
tively easy, or in slump periods, when it becomes difficult. The 
effect of the factors in question is indirect, when it is the broad 
masses of the population that have to bear the consequences of the 
existence of structural stumbling-blocks to development and of the 
regressive methods chosen to deal with these obstacles. This is 
particularly true of import substitution activities, whose costs, plus 
the excessive profit margins permitted by tariff protection, are 
transferred to prices ; and it also applies to the higher cost of certain 
agricultural products, often important items of mass consumption, 
mainly because of the obstacles to increased production arising from 
the prevailing form of land tenure. These and other elements 
constitute non-monetary inflationary factors. 
The lower strata of the Latin American population are begin-
ning to use their growing political and trade union power to defend 
themselves against the rise in prices resulting from these monetary 
and non-monetary inflationary factors. They are doing so by 
means of wage increases, in the first place, and, secondly, by ob-
taining social security benefits and other State services intended to 
improve their situation. But when increases in wages, social secu-
rity contributions and indirect taxes are not or cannot be absorbed 
by entrepreneurs' profits, as is generally the case, they force up 
costs and are transferred to prices, thus promoting credit expan-
sion, and leading to new increases in wages, security benefits and 
taxes, in the all-too-familiar spiral. This does not mean that some 
of the workers and employees do not generally succeed in recoup-
ing themselves for the effects of price increases, and even in more 
than offsetting them; but they do so only at the expense of other 
social groups. The chief victims are the rural workers, who have 
no trade union power, generally receive little or nothing in the 
way of social security benefits, and do not enjoy the same State 
services as people in the towns. Other groups affected are those 
workers and employers, either active or retired, who because they 
are less well-equipped to defend themselves are left behind when 
it comes to wage increases, or those who share with the entre-
preneurs the ill-effects of currency over-valuation on the income 
of export or substitution activities, which also aggravate the 
tendency for the external sector to become a development bottle-
neck. Lastly, the understandable reluctance to increase taxes or 
public utility rates in proportion to the wage increases of those 
employed by the State or by the enterprises concerned enables the 
rest of the community to defend their real income to a correspond-
ing extent, but not on any lasting basis, since the deficit resulting 
from such attitudes inevitably leads to a blanket rise in prices. 
These delays in raising the wages of the groups left in the 
rear, and in adjusting exchange rates, taxes and public utility 
Y 
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tariffs, cannot continue indefinitely, and as the under-privileged 
groups succeed in gaining ground and the State changes its attitude, 
the spiral is given increasing impetus, and is even further in-
tensified if the pace of economic activity is reduced. 
2. Reluctance to adopt drastic solutions 
Thus the spiral gradually exhausts its corrective effects and 
becomes an increasingly disruptive influence. Unquestionably, this 
is fully known and understood. But what other recourse remains 
if basic solutions are shirked? Letting the spiral take its course 
is generally the easiest way out in the short run. It is usual to 
resort to what is feasible from a political point of view even if it 
is not advisable from a rational standpoint. 
Suffice it to note the obvious contrast between the formidable 
opposition usually aroused by any attempt to even up distribu-
tional disparities through tax reform, and the very liberal nature 
of certain social security benefits and State services whose costs 
fall, in the last analysis (although very unevenly), on the broad 
masses of the population who are supposed to benefit. Much the 
same is true of mass wage and salary increases. 
But what is the point of these solutions? They aTe certainly 
not simple. The problem is greatly complicated by the fact that to 
the elements of traditional inflation have been added those others 
whose elimination will be a lengthy business, since they derive 
from structural weaknesses. 
In the traditional type of inflation, of a monetary character, 
real wages can recoup their losses at the expense of inflationary 
entrepreneurial profits. But the situation is different when price 
increases have a non-monetary basis. This is a question of infla-
tionary elements which, because they cannot be absorbed by in-
creases in productivity, have long and steadily been moving up 
the spiral. 
In such cases the basic solution can only be more rapid devel-
opment, accompanied by a policy of income redistribution. How-
ever, this takes time, and during the interval an anti-inflationary 
policy means a sacrifice by the lower strata of the population such 
as could only be tolerated from the psychological and political 
standpoints if an expansionist policy were simultaneously intro-
duced to stimulate the use of the economy's idle capacity, with 
the ensuing Tapid rise in income, and a policy of austerity in respect 
of the higher groups to reduce their consumption sharply and pro-
mote an increase in investment. All this should be combined with 
the timely contribution of international resources. The resulting 
improvement in the rate of development would be the only means 
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of compensating real wages for what they had lost through the non-
monetary forms of inflation. 
As can be seen, this is a strictly political aspect of the problem, 
since a solution of this nature requires, in addition to the firm 
decisions involved, the full support and understanding of the 
masses, although this support must not be undermined by pre-
mature or excessive pressure or demands that would wreck the 
whole programme of rehabilitation and expansion. 
3. Stabilisation policy 
Thus monetary stabilization is not conceivable except in rela-
tion to a policy of economic development and social justice. In 
fact, regarding stabilization as a solution in itself has often led to 
failure in the laudable attempt to end inflation. 
The principal instrument of this type of stabilization is credit 
machinery. Undeniably, an external imbalance can be temporarily 
eliminated through a reduction of total income brought about by 
restrictive use of this instrument. It can be eliminated, but not 
remedied, since however long the depressive effects of the policy 
involved may be endured, sooner or later rational measures aimed 
at recovery will have to be taken, and the consequent rise in income 
will resurrect the external disequilibrium. 
With respect to internal imbalances, an attempt to remedy 
the government deficit by economic contraction generally has 
exactly the opposite effect, because of its depressive repercussions 
on the country's tax capacity, and also—to the detriment of invest-
ment—on the capacity to save. 
From another standpoint, the social strife implicit in inflation 
is generally intensified by the dynamic weakness referred to earlier,4 
that is, the inability of the system, as it functions at present, to 
absorb the population displaced from rural areas and those already 
living in the towns who have been unable to find employment in 
productive activities. In the meantime, these people take refuge 
in unskilled personal services, and redundant or unnecessary work 
in private and State activities, and the brunt of all this is borne 
by the lower social strata. Thus, lack of dynamism becomes another 
of the potent causes of non-monetary inflation. 
In the final analysis the superfluous staff taken on in private 
administration, who do not produce a corresponding amount of 
goods and services, create pressure on the goods and services 
produced by others, and thus provide a powerful stimulus to the 
inflationary spiral. 
* See chapter I of this part of the study. 
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Here too the simplistic approach has its own formula, which 
is merely to send these superfluous workers packing. One of the 
implicit advantages of credit restriction is in fact to break public 
or trade union resistance to these so-called economic rehabilitation 
measures. Here again, all that is done is to side-step a problem 
which must be faced, namely, that of increasing the pace of devel-
opment to correct the lack of dynamism. 
Our frank stand against such simplistic views is usually inter-
preted as defence of inflation and opposition to anti-inflationary 
measures. This is far from being the case, since inflation, in the 
final analysis, is the result of a structure that is curbing develop-
ment, both by preventing full use of the savings potential and by 
putting obstacles in the path of technical progress. Thus the prob-
lem of inflation is inseparable from the development problem, and 
monetary policy must be an integral part of the policy of economic 
and social development. Otherwise anti-inflationary measures are 
sooner or later doomed to failure. 
But continuing inflation is not a valid alternative either. As 
we wrote some time ago in another paper: "If the system under 
which we live cannot develop without it, inflation will be an alterna-
tive that leads nowhere. For it corrodes the economy and danger-
ously disrupts society. Impossible, then, to deny the rationality of 
inflation as an instrument, not to infuse the system with dynamic 
vigour, but to sweep it inexorably onward to disintegration."8 
I I I . TWO TYPES OF FOREIGN CAPITAL 
1. The persistence of enclaves 
The social structure handed down from the times of externally-
geared development was associated with the characteristic type of 
foreign investment aimed mainly at serving, in one way or another, 
the interests of the major centres of which the undertakings con-
cerned were an offshoot. They continue essentially, now as then, 
to lean towards the development of mineral resources, export and 
allied activities, and public utility concessions. 
These are the enclaves to which reference has already been 
made. In those days, any inflow of advanced techniques was con-
fined to them. They made no attempt to disseminate such tech-
niques within the country, nor was there any reason for them to 
do so, since extensive farming of the land by the country's own 
rural population usually required no more than a rudimentary 
technology. Moreover, such private enterprise as emerged from 
8See "Economic Development or Monetary Stability: the False 
Dilemma", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VI, No. 1, March 
1961, p. 25. 
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time to time in our countries to engage in activities similar to those 
of the enclaves often ended in the domestic efforts being engulfed 
by them or disappearing under their economic pressure. 
However, this did not affect the compatibility of the foreign 
enterprises with the prevailing social structure. On the contrary, 
the latter is gaining strength and substance as time goes by ; the 
ruling groups—relying on their privileged position as landowners— 
are enjoying the benefits of the steady increase in the value of the 
land deriving from population growth and from the externally-
geared development fostered by the foreign enterprises. At the 
same time they participate, albeit tangentially, in the activities of 
these enterprises, chiefly by being of service to them in their rela-
tions with the public authorities. They are thus able to lead that 
typical life of ease which is conducive to the enjoyment of Euro-
pean culture—cultural development within under-development— 
and to participation in political campaigning often confined to these 
same ruling groups, the broad masses being called upon regularly 
or occasionally to accommodate their internal differences. 
These enclaves of the past, which are still with us, must either 
change of themselves or give way to domestic enterprise. The days 
when foreign enterprise came in to do what Latin America could 
not are definitely over. We need the outside world to help us to 
cultivate our own ability, so that the population as a whole can 
be brought to share in the process of development. Thus, the for-
eign enterprise must be a nucleus for the dissemination of tech-
nology, as it already is in some cases. 
While there are a few encouraging signs of such a change, 
much still remains to be done. Of course, the proportion of net 
income left in a given country by these enterprises is usually larger 
than before, when they were relatively small. But the nationals 
concerned generally have little—if any—access to technology, and 
decisions are taken abroad, without the country's influencing them 
to any great extent, however important they may be to its interests. 
There are even cases where the actual pattern of exports is beyond 
the control of Latin American trade policy. 
There is a pressing need for new formulas to solve these prob-
lems, not only in connexion with this form of business activity 
per se but also because the new formulas in question will help to 
create an atmosphere conducive to the co-operation of foreign 
capital in the new stage of industrialization which must be em-
barked upon without delay. 
Strictly speaking, a clear distinction must be made between 
two types of foreign capital : the out-dated type, with the enclaves 
which still subsist, and the new type which takes a determined 
share in the intensive process of industrialization. 
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2. Other problems oj joreign capital 
Of course, this latter mode of procedure also raises some prob-
lems, but they can be solved without too much difficulty. Among 
the more important are those deriving from the policy of the 
country itself. 
In the first place, the huge profits made by some firms. The 
profit incentive is clearly essential if foreign private enterprise is 
to he attracted. However, it should be the consequence of the 
advanced techniques such firms bring into the country, the new 
patterns of production, organization and marketing they introduce 
into the local milieu. No impartial view can call this in question. 
But here too the effects of undue protection and inflation are left, 
to which must be added some cases of spurious incorporation of 
foreign capital under the protection of official action itself. As 
regards this whole state of affairs, the Latin American Govern-
ments are in a position to apply corrective measures not so much 
to suppress its effects as to attack its very causes in respect of both 
foreign and domestic firms. 
The other problem, which demands a much greater and more 
sustained effort, is the technical and economic inferiority of Latin 
American enterprise as compared with its foreign counterpart. We 
have many times commented on this. While it is a quite natural 
phenomenon, measures leading to the progressive establishment of 
a reasonable balance should be adopted. Elsewhere in the present 
document reference is made to these measures, which need not be 
confined to the common market, although it is there that the need 
for them is most pressing.8 
Rightly considered, undue protection also influences the tech-
nical inferiority of the domestic enterprise because it weakens the 
initiative of the executives and thus does not encourage them to 
improve their techniques. On more than one occasion we have 
seen domestic firms either absorbed or dislodged by foreign enter-
prises when engaged in activities in which it would not have been 
difficult—with greater initiative and more funds—to assimilate new 
production techniques. 
Even more complicated is the problem created by some firms 
which are part of international trusts and which, by dividing the 
markets among themselves, usually hamper the domestic produc-
tion effort. Here State intervention, either to do what has to be 
done or to let others do it, is unavoidable. 
Moreover, in a development plan it is quite right that each 
country should clearly define those priority areas in which it would 
like to have the co-operation of foreign private enterprise. While 
6
 See part C. 
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no attempt can be made to suggest these areas here and now, it 
would seem obvious that, in a programme designed to encourage 
exports, foreign enterprise has a very important part to play, both 
because of its knowledge of export practices and external markets, 
and on account of its level of technical and economic know-how, 
which domestic firms cannot usually attain in a short time. Here, 
as in any other industrial activity, a partnership between foreign 
and Latin American enterprise might be a very suitable solution, 
from the standpoint both of dissemination of techniques and of 
improved relations with domestic interests. Such a partnership 
should be a clearly-defined objective in the granting of tax exemp-
tions by capital-importing countries. Otherwise, foreign investment 
might carry undue weight in some branches of economic activity, 
which would be undesirable from various points of view. 
By thus acting as an agent for the propagation of advanced 
techniques within the country concerned, the foreign enterprise 
would play a part in the development of Latin America very dif-
ferent from the role it had in the past, notwithstanding the sig-
nificance of its contribution to externally-geared development. In 
those days, however, the existing type of foreign enterprise fitted 
easily into the social structure, and as this structure changes to 
meet the exigencies of development, the foreign enterprise must 
inevitably change as well. 
IV. PLANNING AND THE OPERATION OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
1. Public administration as it reflects the social structure 
If Latin American private enterprise is lagging behind the 
requirements of development, it is not surprising that the same is 
true of public administration. Its organization is a survival from 
times past, with additions and adjustments, but without basic 
changes. 
It is not that there is any unawareness of the defects of the 
public administration, or any lack of urgent calls for reform; but 
for reasons similar to those that have led to the maintenance of 
the existing social structure, and others as well, the public admin-
istration in our countries has not undergone any change. 
Actually, the prevailing type of public administration is in 
line with the social structure. The fact that nearly half the active 
population ekes out a living in agriculture has had no more effect 
than to procure the allocation of a tiny fraction of budget resources 
for technological research and the dissemination of its findings, 
since the prevailing system of land tenure does not demand such 
measures. Taxation, properly used, is a powerful instrument for 
economic development and distributional justice, and our countries' 
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experience would suffice, in combination with some external 
assistance, to enable us to organize the tax machinery efficiently, 
prevent evasion and modify the fiscal system in general. If this 
has not been achieved in the way and to the extent necessary, the 
resistance of the ruling groups is largely to blame. Many other 
examples could be mentioned. Broadly speaking, these groups do 
not demand efficiency; and what is more serious, the political 
movements of the lower groups have seldom made much endeavour 
to improve public administration. 
In fact, all the old ways survive, and one clientele gives way 
to another in the administration, since there are few Latin Ameri-
can countries that have an effective civil service. Quantity rather 
than quality is the basis of staffing, and the poor salaries—in some 
cases Teduced by inflation to unbelievably low levels, until the spiral 
makes it possible to recover what has been lost, or a part of it— 
drive away the most able and disorganize the whole system. 
Given this state of affairs, the plan—essentially popular in its 
origin—of transferring certain foreign-owned enclaves to national 
ownership has often had disastrous results. This does not mean 
that it is impossible to find, or train, men who can run such ac-
tivities efficiently, but the impetus of strong feeling is not enough ; 
judicious selection, discipline, and steadfastness are a sine qua non. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see in all this merely 
the play of economic interests, political pressures or perhaps the 
warping of certain State machinery from its true purpose. There is 
a background of inertia, of perpetuation of inefficiency, which is 
preventing the public administration in Latin America from adapt-
ing itself to the requirements of economic development, except in 
a few special cases. This applies to simple as well as to complicated 
functions, and the result is apparent in the needless trammelling of 
economic activity—in fact of all activities that bear any relation 
to the State—and in every imaginable kind of inefficient and time-
consuming procedure. Naturally, ours has the weaknesses inherent 
in all bureaucracies, but it displays marked symptoms of under-
development as well. In short, the public sector betrays itself as 
behind the times, not only in its administrative functions, but also 
in the inadequacy of the existing machinery when it comes to 
bringing new ideas to the fore, and formulating and carrying out 
a rational development policy. 
2. Plans and planning 
In our countries the State is not organized for the last-named 
functions. This must be frankly admitted, now that we are begin-
ning to open our minds to the idea of planning. Plans are beginning 
to be put forward, but the actual work of planning, in the broadest 
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and most responsible sense, is either non-existent or exists only in 
embryo.7 
Planning has three separate aspects, although they are all 
closely linked: (a) the conception of the plan, (b) the translation 
of this plan into a series of practical measures and specific projects, 
and (c) the administrative organization required for the two 
previous tasks and for the execution and supervision of the plan, 
as well as its constant adjustment to changed circumstances. In 
other words, an economic and social development plan entails the 
planning of a public administration capable of furthering its ob-
jectives. 
The most significant advance has been achieved mainly in the 
first phase, that of conception. Much less progress has been made 
in planning proper, although there are signs that the Governments 
are beginning to recognize the significance of this fact. 
Once the over-all development targets have been quantified, 
together with individual goals for the various economic and social 
sectors, and the funds necessary to achieve them have been deter-
mined, the next step should be to embark on the actual measures 
and specific projects at once. Many of these can even be prepared 
and carried out as the plan takes shape. However, this does not 
generally happen with the necessary dispatch, even in cases where 
there are sufficient internal or external funds for the preparation 
of projects. It is not unusual to find measures that clash with the 
aims of the plan, for when there is no proper planning organiza-
tion, there is generally a characteristic dichotomy between current 
problems and development problems, between immediate action and 
planning, as if these were not merely two sides of the same coin. 
Thus, a plan without planning activity is pointless. At best it 
is the rational formulation of a body of ideas, valuable enough as 
an ordered presentation of problems and possible ways of solving 
them, but not as a complex of elements that can serve as the basis 
for practical action. 
Furthermore, as a result of the pressure of circumstances, 
plans have often tended to be drawn up by a small group of people 
who have been unable to make use of the piecemeal experience of 
a host of government departments—the experience of the vast num-
ber of people who will have to execute the plan without having had 
the opportunity of co-operating in the determination of its aims. 
In other words, the body responsible for formulating the plan is 
often superimposed on the existing administrative organization 
without in any way becoming a part of it. There must be an effort 
7
 The secretariat has carried out a study on the existing situation in this 
field. See Progress in the Planning Field in Latin America (E/CN.12/677). 
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to achieve integration, following one basic principle : the plan must 
not be created only from above ; it must come from below, travel-
ling up through all the responsible levels of the administration. 
All these weaknesses are easy to understand, and in no way 
detract from the admirable achievement of those Governments who 
have undertaken the formulation of plans; if they had not done 
so the weaknesses in question would not have appeared. The next 
step is to carry out the far from easy task of making the administra-
tive machinery capable of responding to the needs of planning. 
The unremitting labour it involves can only be successfully under-
taken if a firm decision at the top has the backing of the senior 
officials in the administration, since they must all take an active 
part in the work of planning. 
3. The power of the State and ways of exercising it 
From another standpoint, this planning task, the effort to act 
consciously upon the forces of development, means giving the State 
considerable power. We cannot deny this, or escape the anxious 
misgivings that often trouble even those who are convinced of the 
need to carry out the structural changes referred to and clear the 
way for State planning, to say nothing of those who are strongly 
opposed to such a course. How far will the endeavour to regulate 
the forces of development subordinate individuals to the power of 
the State ? Shall we have to sound a retreat in the historic struggle 
to prevent the dominion of a few men, of a minority, over the rest 
of the community? Is there a basic conflict between the accelera-
tion of development and a steady advance towards democracy ? Or 
can we succeed in synthesizing these two aims by giving Latin 
American democracy an economic and social content? 
An understandable confusion exists in regard to all this. If we 
are to achieve a synthesis we must, in influencing the forces of 
development, combine economic and social aims with political ob-
jectives. And to reconcile the two we must effect a harmonious 
combination of State action with individual initiative. The State 
will not prescribe the conduct of individuals, that is, say what they 
must do or leave undone in their economic activity. It acquires an 
impersonal power not over them but over the forces that actuate 
them. This power must be exercised basically by means of incen-
tives to economic action, rather than by coercion, once the struc-
tural problems that stifle development have been overcome, because 
coercive elements in the operation of the system open the way to 
arbitrary dominion of the State over the individual. 
This is a fundamental and crucial point, which it is essential to 
clarify. We_ must consider whether the ways in which the State 
carries out its plan to regulate the forces of development do or do 
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not interfere with the behaviour of the individual, or endanger the 
independence of his personal decisions. 
In this context, what is the significance of State action to 
ensure that better use is made of the savings potential ? What con-
sequences will flow from the way in which the State tries to in-
fluence individual enterprise in order to induce it to fulfil the aims 
of the plan? How far is the technical action of the State likely to 
affect the independence of personal decisions? 
Let us look first at the problem of capital formation. As stated 
in the preceding chapter, a distinction must be drawn between the 
initial steps to make full use of the savings potential, and the sub-
sequent operation of the system. As to the former, it was stated 
that this problem could not be envisaged solely in the light of the 
distributional privileges that characterize the present social struc-
ture, since these must be gradually reduced and eliminated by 
structural reforms. 
Thus, the problem of capital formation must also be considered 
from the standpoint of the ultimate operation of the system. Once 
the structural changes have taken place, the State will have to 
continue intervening by means of incentives to encourage saving, 
or by taking part of personal income in the form of taxes. 
Only experience can show how far this aim can be attained 
by means of incentives, and how far coercion will have to be used. 
Nevertheless, there are limits beyond which coercion cannot be 
pushed within the existing institutional systems, since to do so 
would dangerously weaken incentives to economic activity. This is 
a most important point, since once these limits have been exceeded 
the way will be open to direct economic action by the State and 
to the concentration of economic power in its hands, thus increas-
ing its capacity to interfere in the personal freedom of action of the 
individual. 
But as long as this extreme is not reached, the power of the 
State, great as it may be, can be exercised at an absolutely im-
personal level, without implying in any way the subordination of 
the individual. Consumption can be restricted in relation to income 
levels, not to persons. Every man will be free to consume and to 
use his savings as he wishes. The same can be said of measures 
for redistributing income: this should be done in relation not to 
the individual, but to his social level, so that it can be raised without 
distinction of persons. 
But even if the validity of these arguments were admitted, the 
discovery of the unknown quantity would not be complete. In 
order to regulate the forces of development the State must influence 
individual enterprise in economic activity. And another question 
immediately arises: will this not give the State the opportunity of 
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interfering with personal freedom of action, of compelling the indi-
vidual to do what he does not want to do? Furthermore, why must 
the State intervene? Is not the play of market forces sufficient to 
guide individual decisions? 
The response to these questions covers two main points : (a) 
the State must intervene because the pointers afforded by the 
market do not always lead to action that will promote the most 
economic use of the available resources, and (b) it must do so 
because the indications provided by market forces have a bearing 
only on some of the decisions of the individual, not on all of them, 
and in particular not on those that are of considerable importance 
in development. State intervention is essential to guide private 
activity, and to induce it, without coercion of any kind, to fulfil 
certain development aims. 
We need not concern ourselves with the first point, since it 
has been explained in the preceding chapter how the labour-cost/ 
capital-cost ratio has been distorted, at the expense of the most 
economic use of resources. This situation can also be remedied on 
an impersonal basis, by the creation of certain conditions that will 
induce private enterprise to take one path or another, without com-
pulsory measures of any kind. 
Now let us consider the second point. As we know, the indica-
tions that determine individual economic behaviour in the market 
are given by price movements. Price is an effective pointer to the 
road that new investment should follow. This applies to most 
goods and services, and the State usually has no reason to intervene, 
except when the operation of competition is distorted.8 However, 
it can enable individuals to make their own forecasts on the basis 
of better information on market movements and the probable course 
of future demand. 
But there are a small number of goods and services, of strategic 
importance in economic development, in the case of which invest-
ments take a relatively long time to bring in a return and price is 
no guide. A deficit in the supply of these goods and services usually 
has a serious effect on the development of the whole economy. 
This is where the State must supply other pointers to make up 
for the lack of spontaneous indicators, and provide inducements 
to private enterprise to follow the pointers in question. In Latin 
America critical situations have arisen most frequently in con-
nexion with energy, transport, and public utilities in general, with 
agricultural production, and with import substitution. In none of 
these fields does the market provide any sound indicators, and 
8
 Naturally, there are also non-economic reasons—ethical, health or 
cultural factors—which may make State action advisable, but this has 
nothing to do with planning. 
61 
consequently private enterprise cannot act effectively without State 
guidance. Future demand must be estimated in accordance with 
the desired Tate of income growth, production conditions must be 
studied and investment promoted a number of years in advance, 
by means of incentives offered by the State. All this is beyond the 
capacity of private persons operating in the market. 
With respect to import substitution—which holds and must 
continue to hold such an important place in our national and 
regional development planning—this special feature of course exists. 
In a number of cases demand estimates must relate to goods im-
ported not directly but as the component parts of the finished 
article. Consequently the price system plays no part. When the 
goods in question are replaced by domestically-produced articles, 
these components have to be imported—whether in the form of 
raw materials or intermediate goods—and so do the capital goods 
needed to manufacture the articles concerned. All this can be fore-
seen, and such prevision is essential if investment is to be cor-
rectly channelled and the external bottleneck avoided. The develop-
ment of industrial exports that must take place in order to solve 
this problem will introduce new factors into the work of anticipat-
ing future demand, as regards exports both to the common market 
and to the rest of the world. 
As can be seen, although this task of guiding private enter-
prise by State intervention is of considerable importance, it can 
be carried out without coercion, by the mere deployment of in-
centives and disincentives. Thus there is no encroachment of any 
kind on the independence of individual decisions, nor is the be-
haviour of individuals governed by what the State determines in 
each case. 
The same can be said of technical action by the State to stimu-
late the assimilation of modern technology. This is a question not 
only of guiding individual enterprise, but of direct State action, 
both in research and the spread of technology, and in respect of 
the education needed to apply this technology. The price system 
can play no part in solving these problems. It is the State, for the 
most part, that must determine what is best to be done and how 
to do it, and must make large-scale investment. But this does not 
impose any kind of compulsion on individuals to use this tech-
nology, or to train themselves to apply it. This too is a matter of 
incentives and disincentives. 
However, there is one very important exception, relating to 
the conservation and use of natural resources. Here coercive meas-
ures are required in order to prevent the destruction of a country's 
natural wealth by private enterprise, but this action, too, is im-
personal in character. 
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4. Direct economic action by the State 
The State does not need to have all the power in its hands in 
order to regulate the forces of development and social progress. 
But it is easy to see why there is still a great deal of confusion as 
to the meaning of planning action by the State to achieve this 
aim, since until a few years ago planning took place only as part 
of a socialist conception of the economy. 
Under the influence of the socialist experience, it is often 
thought that direct economic action by the State is essential to 
planning action. Thus the discussion frequently wanders off on 
to the hackneyed topic of the merits or demerits of private enter-
prise as opposed to State enterprise. This abstract plane is certainly 
not the appropriate one for the discussion, since it has to be made 
clear what kind of private enterprise is being thus extolled. 
Is it simply and solely the form that prevails in the present 
social structure, or is it the type that would rise vigorously to the 
surface if that structure were changed ? 
If the second question were answered in the affirmative, and 
not the first, the discussion could be confined to indicating those 
typical cases in which, even if the system were to acquire its full 
dynamic impetus, there would be weighty reasons for State action 
in our countries. Some of these reasons have to do with economic 
development. There are cases in which the State has had to under-
take activities in the strategic areas of the economic system, or 
make investments which have not proved attractive to private 
enterprise. In other instances, State action has had the virtue of 
building up a technical capacity that would have been difficult to 
achieve otherwise. 
Apart from these development considerations, there are other 
motives that in Latin America's experience are generally important : 
avoidance of an excessive concentration of economic power, and, 
consequently, of political influence, in private hands; and the 
taking-over by the State of enterprises that by their nature are 
monopolistic, or of activities which might otherwise be carried 
out by international combines that limit competition, and are un-
favourable to certain national development aims. 
But all these weighty reasons, and others that are perhaps less 
so, are extraneous to the actual requirements of planning, since 
the State, as already indicated, can effectively achieve its develop-
ment objectives by incentives and disincentives to private enter-
prise. And from this point of view, direct State action would be 
justified if such instruments did not give the desired results. 
These considerations relating to the tools to be used are of 
great pragmatic importance, and the following aspect of the prob-
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lem should be approached on a pragmatic basis too. Needless to 
say, planning requires the State to undertake highly complex func-
tions. One of the reasons for the lack of ability to tackle certain 
development problems demonstrated thus far by the public admin-
istration in our countries has been the proliferation of tasks and 
responsibilities, great and small, which generally overburden of-
ficials at the higher levels. It is true that this is above all a ques-
tion of good organization and delegation of responsibilities within 
the administrative hierarchy; but it is equally undeniable that the 
farther State action is extended, the more difficult it will be for 
the higher levels of the administration to devote attention to deci-
sions on development planning. 
The essential aim must be to make the State more capable of 
regulating the forces of development by means of the machinery 
of the system, without interfering with the personal behaviour of 
the individual. There is nothing inherent in planning, or in the 
dissemination of modern technology, that must lead to the sub-
ordination of the individual at the expense of his fundamental 
rights. 
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DISPARITIES IN DEMAND AND THEIR EFFECT 
ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
I. EXTERNAL IMBALANCE 
1. The importance of disparities in international demand 
The 'two world wars and the intervening great depression 
disrupted the international economic system handed down from the 
nineteenth century. The persistent delusion that this system could 
be restored under conditions far different from those which pre-
vailed at that time has finally had to be abandoned, and has given 
way to the realization that a new order is essential in the inter-
national field as well. 
The European Common Market, the COMECON of the 
socialist countries, the new United States policy of lowering and 
abolishing customs tariffs among the major industrial centres of 
the Atlantic Community, are clear manifestations of the energetic 
search for a fresh approach. The proposals for Latin American 
integration are another case in point: bold and decisive for the 
small Central American countries, and a trifle apprehensive, but 
nevertheless promising, in their initial stages, for the Latin Ameri-
can Free-Trade Association. 
This piecemeal and at times self-contradictory search for new 
solutions postulates the need for a thorough review of the present 
state of affairs. No other meaning can be attached to the world 
Conference on Trade and Development convened by the United 
Nations. The fact that the Latin American countries are prominent 
among those which promote this initiative is an encouraging sign. 
The Conference will give to all of them, and to all the peripheral 
countries of the world, an historic and unique opportunity to con-
tribute, conjointly with the developed countries, to the establish-
ment of a new international economic order, although in very 
different circumstances from those attending the Havana Confer-
ence, which has now been outstripped by events. 
Vast opportunities can be clearly discerned. The countries of 
Europe—those with a private-enterprise economy as well as the 
socialist countries—have achieved high growth rates. Japan too 
has done so, and it is to be expected that the United States, with 
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its vast capital formation and consumption potential, will succeed 
in doing so likewise. How can the developing countries turn this 
economic expansion in the more advanced countries to good ac-
count? How can the latter find in the expansion of the peripheral 
economies a growing market for goods which are difficult to manu-
facture and with respect to which the developed countries are 
clearly in an advantageous position? 
This raises a substantive problem, not as an intellectual 
exercise but as a living expression of the growing external diffi-
culties that beset the developing countries. We are witnessing a 
manifest trend towards an external bottleneck in economic develop-
ment. Temporary factors are not responsible for this situation, 
although they may add to the difficulties in question. Its cause is 
to be found in a persistent phenomenon which must be combated : 
the divergent trends of international demand and their effect on 
exports and the relative prices of these. The internal effort made 
by our countries to overcome this handicap has been inadequate, 
and moreover, is meeting with obstacles on an increasing scale. 
The factors responsible for the disparity between the growth 
of internal demand for primary products in our countries and that 
of demand for manufactured goods and skilled services, as per 
capita income increases, also affect the international field. But 
there they display certain peculiarities. In the first place, the fact 
that the population of the major centres which purchase Latin 
American primary commodities is growing less quickly than that 
of our countries is reflected unduly in the slow rate of increase 
of demand. Secondly, the income-elasticity of demand for food is 
not great as in our countries, and there is less demand for raw 
materials, since the use of natural raw materials has been reduced, 
eliminated or rendered more efficient by technical progress. 
To these spontaneous factors prejudicial to demand for prim-
ary commodities should be added the recrudescence of restrictive 
measures which limit or prohibit the entry of such products into 
the major industrial centres, and the adverse repercussions on 
production in the developing countries deriving from the liquida-
tion of surpluses on world markets, at prices below those prevail-
ing in the domestic market. All this has sharpened—at times very 
considerably—the divergent trends in international demand which 
are reflected in the slow growth rate of exports from countries 
producing primary commodities, as compared with the strength of 
their demand for imports of manufactured goods. 
The policy which thus adversely affects the peripheral coun-
tries actually began with the world depression; until then protec-
tionism had not been excessive—except in the United States—nor 
had there been direct restrictions, or surpluses to be unloaded. 
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Moreover, the nineteenth century was on the whole characterized 
in the major centres by the promotion of imports of foodstuffs and 
raw materials at the expense of domestic production. 
While these spontaneous disparities in international demand 
no doubt began to develop before that grave world event—the 
depression—they did not have an appreciable effect on the ex-
ternally-geared development which was typical of the Latin Ameri-
can countries, and was carried forward by the sheer dynamic 
impetus of their exports and the foreign investment aimed at en-
couraging these. The world depression definitely marked the end 
of this pattern of development ; and the disparities became serious 
and persistent, with most unfavourable effects on international com-
merce and on the terms of trade. Given the impossibility of main-
taining or accelerating the previous growth rate of traditional 
exports, recourse was inevitably had to import substitution—chiefly 
in respect of industrial items'—in an attempt to counteract the dis-
parities in question, and thus began the internally-geared develop-
ment of the Latin American countries. 
This internally-geared development has already fulfilled its 
most important role : without it, average per capita income, which 
is now 60 per cent higher than it was in 1930 for Latin America 
as a whole, could not have been raised. But while the result was 
definitely positive, it could have been better. We see this clearly 
now, and can more readily appreciate the grave shortcomings 
inherent in this type of makeshift development, which is leading 
us to an increasingly serious external bottleneck. 
2. The end of the easy stage of import substitution policy 
The possibilities of development based exclusively on tradi-
tional exports and on import substitution are rapidly being ex-
hausted in the countries where the process of industrialization is 
most advanced ; for exports are expanding at a relatively slow rate, 
and the continuation of the substitution process so that the rate 
of internal development may be much more rapid than the growth 
of exports tends to meet with increasing difficulties. 
In fact, the stage of easy substitution is past. It was rela-
tively simple to substitute domestic production for imports of 
industrial items of current consumption and of some durable con-
sumer and capital goods, and there is little margin left for subtitu-
tion in this field in most of Latin America. We are now moving 
into the stage of import substitution in respect of intermediate 
goods or durable consumer or capital goods, which, besides being 
difficult to manufacture, require markets much larger than those 
of the individual Latin American countries. Moreover, there are 
some intermediate goods for which substitution possibilities are 
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few, or simply non-existent, because of the shortage or total lack 
of natural resources. With respect to foodstuffs, substitution pros-
pects are still very good for some items, while others present in-
creasing difficulties in view of the growth of the population and 
its needs. 
In short, substitution must be a continuing process so long as 
the divergent trends have not been corrected, and corrected they 
cannot be if the present pattern of trade is maintained. When some 
substitutions have been effected, the need for others crops up, and 
additional and greater obstacles are encountered all the time. 
Thus a paradoxical situation has been reached. Imports at 
present account for a relatively small share (12 per cent) of Latin 
America's over-all income, whereas they represented 28 per cent 
of that income before the world depression. The new substitutions 
—«ince they represent an increasingly smaller fraction of over-all 
income—could logically have been expected to entail less effort. 
Today, however, the external bottleneck produced by the disparities 
referred to is much more difficult to eliminate. 
This is due not only to the complexity and cost of the items 
now involved in the substitution process, but also to the fact that 
the reducible margin of imports has disappeared or has been re-
duced to a negligible proportion. As long as there was an ample 
margin of imports which could be dispensed with in the immediate 
future, or deferred, the expansion of some imports could for the 
moment be held up or their volume restricted while substitution 
was being effected in respect of other items. Imports of essential 
or urgently-needed goods could thus steadily increase without af-
fecting the tempo of internal economic activity. But once this 
margin narrows or disappears altogether, this proceeding cannot 
be repeated, particularly when the flow of exports is reduced or 
their volume is contracted, while demand for such imports con-
tinues to grow. In these circumstances, external disequilibrium 
—and a pressing need for international resources—is the only 
alternative to a slowing-up or definite contraction of the rate of 
economic activity. 
The effects of import substitution as a means of correcting 
this disequilibrium do not last very long for further increases in 
import demand, unaccompanied by a corresponding rise in exports, 
once again lead to an external bottleneck. 
3. Internally-geared industrialisation and exports 
Could this have happened in any other way ? Could the pattern 
have been changed during those thirty years? A set of conditions 
hardly conceivable in those days would have been required. Until 
recently, circumstances did not favour expansion of foreign trade. 
70 
In the years during which the effects of the great depression and 
the post-war period—not to speak of the Second World War 
itself—were still making themselves felt, there was no reason to 
think that the major industrial countries would open their doors 
to exports of peripheral manufactures, or that the Latin American 
countries would be prepared to strive for a foothold in the external 
market, so long as easy import substitutions offered them a grow-
ing and reliable internal market, protected against imports in every 
possible way. Hence, there was no vital need to export industrial 
goods. 
An industrial structure virtually isolated from the outside 
world thus grew up in our countries. In view of the pressing need 
for import substitution, an attempt was made to produce internally 
all items of which importation could be discontinued, at least tem-
porarily, as not being essential to continued economic activity or 
to mass consumption. Imports deemed to be superfluous were the 
first to be restricted or abolished, with the consequent encourage-
ment of substitution activities, in which scarce capital resources 
were invested. The criterion by which the choice was determined 
was based not on considerations of economic expediency, but on 
immediate feasibility, whatever the cost of production.1 
The tendency has been for prohibitions and restrictions to 
take the form of customs tariffs. This is a step in the right direc-
tion. However, these tariffs have been carried to such a pitch that 
they are undoubtedly—on an average—the highest in the world. 
It is not uncommon to find tariff duties of over 500 per cent. 
As is well known, the proliferation of industries of every kind 
in a closed market has deprived the Latin American countries 
of the advantages of specialization and economies of scale, and, 
owing to the protection afforded by excessive tariff duties and 
restrictions, a healthy form of internal competition has failed to 
develop, to the detriment of efficient production.2 
Protection has, of course, been essential in the Latin American 
countries. But it has not been applied with moderation, nor has 
there generally been a policy laid down rationally and with the 
foresight which is essential for the alleviation, if not the prevention, 
of balance-of-payments crises. 
Moreover, the fact that these crises erupt at intervals has 
engendered a most understandable resistance to a policy of moderate 
tariffs designed, within limits, to encourage competition from 
1A critical analysis of the process of industrialization was offered 
earlier, in the article already quoted: "Economic Development or Monetary 
Stability: the False Dilemma", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. 
VI, No. 1. 
2
 See in this connexion Problemas y perspectivas de la industrialisation 
latinoamericana (E/CN.12/664). 
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abroad. Furthermore, the few experiments along these lines have 
generally proved unsuccessful, since they have resulted in external 
disequilibrium. A more liberal import policy cannot be applied 
unless exports also develop more freely. 
Nor is this all. The closed industrialization fostered by ex-
cessive protectionism, as well as the unduly high customs tariffs 
applied to some staple agricultural commodities, have created a 
cost structure which makes it extremely difficult for Latin America 
to export manufactured goods to the rest of the world. 
The difficulties of this problem have already been explained. 
The high initial costs of industrialization have created a need for 
protection, and excessive protection has resulted in a cost struc-
ture to which indirect taxes and social security contributions are 
added. All this militates both against the export trade and against 
a more rational import policy, and thus makes for the perpetuation 
of the closed system, to the serious detriment of economic de-
velopment. 
Moreover, the failure of our countries to take the trouble to 
find a solution to this state of affairs is understandable, although 
not justifiable, since a solution would not carry them very far 
without the benefit of the essential complement to this policy : the 
lowering or abolition of customs tariffs in the major industrial 
centres. 
In those centres, factors conducive to a more liberal import 
policy are developing. There is a clear trend towards a progressive 
shortage of manpower, particularly in countries where the rate of 
economic development has been high. This might lead naturally 
to an acceleration of the growth of the capital-intensive industries 
that require a relatively small labour input, and expand more 
slowly than the industries which need a relatively large labour force 
and are less capital-intensive. 
If this should be the case, the major centres would have to 
import the products of the latter in order to meet part of their 
growing demand.3 The developing countries would thus find a 
8
 This seems to be confirmed by an interesting specific case. In one of 
the papers prepared for the Seminar on Industrial Programming recently 
held_ at São Paulo, Brazil, the secretariat presented—as a preliminary in-
vestigation—a projection of the probable comparative evolution of production 
techniques during the next fifteen to twenty years in the textile industries of 
a Latin American country, selected European countries and the United 
States, as well as of wages, labour productivity, and performance of 
machinery. The provisional conclusion arrived at was that in view of the 
expected development of techniques, the relative factor costs and the 
considerable expansion of the markets in the more developed areas, the latter 
will find it cheaper to import from the Latin American countries—and others 
where conditions are similar—the items needed to cover rapidly growing 
sections of their internal demand. 
72 
promising export field for a type of industry which they should 
be particularly anxious to develop as being highly manpower-
absorbing. 
This does not mean that exports of manufactured goods by 
the developing countries will have to be confined to the products 
of industries requiring simple techniques, since there are some 
with advanced techniques in which the high manpower coefficient 
might encourage peripheral exports.4 There may also be industries 
where the ability of the developing countries to compete depends 
less on the proportion of manpower than on the fact that they can 
specialize because of better natural resources or other favourable 
factors, such as differences in the transport costs of exports of raw 
materials and of manufactured goods.5 
In this connexion, the differential tariff treatment according 
to degrees of precessing so often applied in the major centres con-
stitutes a decided obstacle, the removal of which might give a 
strong impetus to some exports, even if the processing of the raw 
materials used were not characterized by a high labour content 
and low capital input. 
As stated elsewhere, this is a field in which it is important 
for empirical research to be undertaken simultaneously in developed 
and developing countries, in order to see what the possibilities are 
and to direct this new policy of individual trade on a basis of 
reciprocal benefits; the great centres would export those manu-
factured goods which they are best qualified to produce, and the 
peripheral countries could carry out their industrialization process 
along more economic lines. 
4. Implicit reciprocity in the major centres 
Some general principles may help to promote this policy from 
the outset. Perhaps the most important of these springs from the 
consideration which has long been advanced in our reports. The 
peripheral countries are in a position diametrically opposed to that 
of the major centres with respect to trade reciprocity. The great 
industrial centres export manufactured goods for which demand 
increases sharply as income rises in the peripheral countries, 
whereas these latter export primary commodities for which the 
4
 This applies to the manufacture of some basic equipment which, by its 
very nature and the fact that it is manufactured to order, requires a large 
labour force. Partly for this reason, manufacturing costs in the more 
developed Latin American countries for much of the equipment in question 
compare favourably with the corresponding costs in countries with more 
advanced techniques. 
5
 The chemical industries provide several cases in which possibilities 
of competition exist. 
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upward trend of demand is more gradual as income rises in the 
major centres. 
Thus the great centres have no need to engage in import 
substitution from this point of view, since the trade disequilibrium 
with the peripheral countries tends to be positive in their case; 
in other words, exports are in excess. On the other hand, the trend 
towards a negative imbalance in the peripheral countries compels 
them to resort to substitution within the present pattern of trade 
in order to avoid a deficit in their balance of payments. 
Moreover, if the major centres, for other reasons which may 
or may not be justified, embark on substitution with respect to 
imports from the peripheral countries, they aggravate this disparity 
in international demand. On the other hand, import substitution 
by the peripheral countries with respect to items from the major 
centres tends to reduce the disparity and thus to make develop-
ment possible. 
This basic 'inequality calls for a revision of the concept of 
reciprocity accepted until now, for if the great centres reduce or 
abolish their customs tariffs, the peripheral countries can increase 
their exports to them. And if this happens, the imports of the 
peripheral countries will also increase, in view of the buoyancy of 
demand for the goods concerned. This is a spontaneous effect not 
requiring any reduction or abolition of tariff duties. Indeed, the 
greater capacity to import thus acquired by the peripheral countries 
will enable them to speed up their development without additional 
substitution, or with less substitution than they would otherwise 
have to undertake; in other words, without having to resort to 
new forms of protection to the same extent. 
To require a developing country to grant equivalent tariff 
concessions would hamper its industrialization, to the obvious 
detriment of its economic development.6 However, this relates only 
to a transitional period, though not, of course, a short one. If the 
export trade of a developing country, thanks to the expansion of 
its external markets, successfully keeps pace with its import de-
mand, it will have corrected its trade disparities and will not need 
to continue the policy of import substitution. 
The peculiar nature of our development phenomena and the 
need for a specific policy to deal with them are manifest in this as 
in other aspects of the problem. These are phenomena which are 
inherent in the phase of transition to the more advanced stages 
already reached by the developed countries, and with which the 
latter did not have to cope because they were the first to develop, 
8
 This point is explained in more detail in the report on Economic 
Development, Planning and International Co-operation, op. cit 
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and because they did so in international conditions very different 
from those obtaining today. 
5. The need to lower tariffs 
There is no suggestion, of course, that in the light of this 
new concept of implicit reciprocity, nothing at all should be done 
about customs tariffs in developing countries. On the contrary, it 
has already been said that Latin America suffers from excessive 
protectionism. The protective barriers do not have to be removed 
in order to apply the concept of reciprocity. To accumulate foreign 
exchange, rather than to import, when its exports increase is not 
typical of Latin America. A more characteristic trait is a tendency 
to import beyond its capacity to do so. From this point of view, 
there is no need to revise tariffs. But from the standpoint of de-
velopment itself revision is necessary, so as gradually to correct 
the serious shortcomings of industrialization. The customs tariffs 
in force for the rest of the world must gradually be lowered, both 
in the light of economic expediency and to ensure that industry 
is constantly encouraged by external competition to narrow the 
gap in productivity vis-à-vis the major centres. 
A reform of this kind obviously cannot be carried out 
where an increasing bottleneck exists. Relief must come rather 
from the external sector, in the shape of speeding-up in the tempo 
of the export trade. In other words, a rational customs tariff 
must be part of an international plan to expand trade on new 
bases. Tariff reform cannot be a prelude to such a policy, but 
must stem from it. 
This being so, another problem arises. If the overhauling of 
the customs tariff must come in the wake of the development of 
new exports, how can such development take place if the present 
structure of high costs and prices is maintained? The question 
deserves careful study, and one of the avenues which might be 
explored is a readjustment of the rate of exchange. A currency 
devaluation is conceivable which, with a minimum of internal 
disruption, might have important external repercussions. Tariffs 
could be reduced in proportion to the increase in the exchange 
rate, and this would not involve either a change in the existing 
degree of protection or higher import prices, except where the 
duties concerned were lower than the reduced tariffs. On the other 
hand, it would improve the external competitive position of a 
series of industries which are unable to export today because of 
their high prices. External prices could be lowered while the same 
nominal internal costs were maintained. 
The traditional exports do not, of course, require this incen-
tive as much as new export lines, except in a few specific cases. 
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Devaluation must therefore be accompanied by a tax to prevent 
excessive profits on exports of traditional commodities or on indus-
trial exports which do not need the stimulus in question. The 
income derived from this tax could be used to compensate for the 
loss of fiscal resources arising from the tariff reduction, and to 
grant import subsidies in favour of mass consumer goods for which 
prices must not be allowed to rise until the increments can be ab-
sorbed by an increase in income. 
In view of the prevailing high level of tariffs, a relatively 
moderate devaluation followed by a corresponding tariff reduction 
would be a step in the right direction, but it would not mean that 
protection was reduced to rational levels. This would have to come 
after positive effects on exports had been achieved. 
No specific proposal is being made here. This is merely an 
idea worth exploring. It has no doubt its drawbacks, but these 
should be considered not so much in themselves as from the stand-
point of the fundamental solution sought. 
If industrial exports are thus encouraged, the asymmetry in 
protection explained earlier will tend to correct itself; and they 
will make it possible to import items which it would be too costly 
to replace by domestically-produced counterparts, and to obtain 
through trade a greater quantity of goods—in some cases of better 
quality—than could be obtained through the substitution process 
at its present stage. 
6. The expansion of world trade 
The Latin American common market is only a partial alterna-
tive to the development of industrial exports to the rest of the 
world. Trade policy must be channelled in both directions. The 
common market will undoubtedly offer great advantages on which 
there is no need to dwell here. It will make it possible to ensure 
a rational division of labour in the new substitution activities and 
to avoid the serious mistakes committed in the past, and will enable 
the effects of these mstakes in existing activities, whether agricul-
tural or industrial, to be gradually rectified. But it will not help 
us, or at least not as effectively as is needed, to solve the problem 
of labour absorption which exists in every Latin American country, 
although not always to the same extent. Hence, industrial inter-
change can hardly be of the same type as in the major centres. 
This is important in itself, but there is another point that also 
has weighty implications. International trade is not static; new 
products and new forms and types of existing products are con-
tinually making their appearance, precisely by virtue of the tech-
nological evolution in the great centres. Moreover, new import 
requirements are bound to be constantly emerging in our countries, 
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to add to those that already exist. In some cases it will be both 
possible and desirable to replace these imports by domestic produc-
tion, whereas it will be inadvisable to do so in others, both on the 
grounds of cost and in order to keep abreast of technical progress 
by continuing to import products that are representative of it. But 
the chances of doing so will be gradually lessened if our capacity 
to import from the major centres continues to be dependent on 
primary exports. For instance, if these were to grow at the rate 
of 2.5 per cent annually—in line with the post-war trend—and per 
capita income were to increase 3 per cent annually in keeping with 
the minimum target already mentioned, within about twenty years 
the coefficient of imports from the rest of the world would have 
dropped to only 6 per cent as against its present level of 11 per cent. 
To grasp the significance of this, it need only be recalled that 
the six countries forming the European Common Market have a 
coefficient of 16 per cent (1960), likewise vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. The United States proposal to make substantial cuts in its 
tariff in exchange for equivalent concessions in the six countries' 
external tariff is inspired precisely by the desire to prevent that 
coefficient from declining instead of increasing. Similar concern 
is felt in the COMECON countries ; the reasons that have induced 
them to oppose the European Common Market are not merely 
political. 
In addition, the need for the Common Market to look out-
wards to the expansion of world trade has been emphatically 
stressed by the Chairman of the Commission of the European Eco-
nomic Community, who recently made the following statement in 
Brussels : "For some time past references have been made to the 
danger of the Community's becoming internally-geared. I do not 
know who is responsible for this catchword. It is, in any case, 
completely divorced from reality. Neither the workings of the Com-
munity nor our economic interests nor our political outlook would 
allow us to become a closed shop. And the rapid expansion of our 
external trade testifies that we are not doing so. However, our 
trading partners undoubtedly are anxious that the Community's 
future development should be as swift as in the past. For only now 
are we coming into possession of the ways and means of translat-
ing our political aims of untrammelled trade, co-operation and aid 
into practical terms in the best possible way".7 
There is no doubt that the progressive establishment of a 
Latin American common market would make it possible to take 
an active part in this policy of international trade expansion, since, 
by favourably influencing industrial production costs, it would 
7
 See the speech by Dr. W. Hallstein at the closing session of the 
European Forum on Latin America (Brussels, 21-23 November 1962). 
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place the Latin American countries on a better competitive footing 
as regards their new exports and would also help them—in view 
of the considerations set forth above—to undertake the revision of 
their tariff policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
X II. T H E INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE PERIPHERAL COUNTRIES 
AND THE TERMS OF TRADE 
1. The factors underlying peripheral weakness 
Ever since the ECLA secretariat issued its first studies, the 
importance of the deterioration in the terms of trade has been 
stressed, and attempts have been made to analyse the forces that 
were tending to cause it. Perhaps because of the piecemeal nature 
of these explanations, our ideas have not always been correctly 
interpreted. It may be well to set them out afresh in the form of 
an elucidatory synthesis, since the deterioration, which has been 
so clearly marked in the last ten years,8 may persist in future and 
have serious repercussions on economic development, even if there 
is no further decline from its present level. 
The origin of this phenomenon is to be found in the relatively 
slow rate at which world demand for primary commodities grows 
in comparison with that for industrial products. The disparity need 
not necessarily bring about any decline in primary prices so long 
as production adjusts itself continually and easily to the tempo 
of demand. But for this to be possible, three conditions which are 
not observed in practice would have to be satisfied : 
(a) The redundant proportion of the increment in the eco-
nomically active population in primary activities would have to 
be displaced, so that production could expand at a rate not exceed-
ing the rate of growth of demand. Other factors being equal, the 
more productivity in primary activities was stepped up, the more 
displacement would have to be intensified; 
(b) The manpower thus displaced would have to be employed 
in industry and other labour-absorbing activities, as explained 
before;9 and 
8
 If the average terms of trade for the period 1950-54 are selected as a 
yardstick, the effect of the deterioration in 1955-60 can be estimated at 
7,400 million dollars. In other words, more than 60 per cent of the annual 
increment in exports was wiped out by the deterioration. The net inflow of 
foreign capital in 1955-60 is estimated to have been about 7,700 million 
dollars (at 1950-54 prices), which means that the repercussions of the 
terms-of-trade position nullified the additional purchasing power achieved by 
the Latin American countries on the basis of that capital. It should be noted 
that relative prices were favourable in 1950-54, even though the level pre-
vailing before the world depression was not fully recovered. 
9
 See part B, chapter I, section I. 
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(c) The manpower in question would have to be absorbed 
quickly and completely enough for the real wages of workers in 
primary activities to rise and advantage to be taken of the incre-
ment in the productivity of the latter. 
As a rule, the wage level in primary activities is lower than 
in urban labour-absorbing activities. If absorption is intensive, 
wages in primary production may mount to the urban level, which 
will rise little by little in keeping with the increase in productivity 
in labour-absorbing activities. Beyond this level, the increment in 
primary productivity will not be retained by the wage increase, 
even if the three conditions stipulated above are complied with. 
If they are not, and the Level of wages in primary activities 
fails to rise to the extent permitted by the increase in productivity, 
the latter will be transmuted into a profit gain and will go to stimu-
late the growth of production beyond the tempo imposed by the 
growth of demand, thereby forcing down the relative prices of 
primary commodities as compared with those of industrial goods. 
The phenomenon of deterioration is to be found as much in 
primary production for domestic consumption as in production for 
export. In the former case, it simply means that the benefits of the 
increase in productivity are transferred internally. In the latter, 
there is a loss of income which the expansion in the volume of 
export trade can do relatively little to offset in comparison with 
the improvement that would have to take place in order to keep 
pace with demand. 
To put the idea in a nutshell, deterioration is caused by the 
lack of dynamism in development, which hinders or precludes 
absorption of the surplus manpower resulting from the sluggish 
growth of demand and higher productivity in primary activities. 
The same factor is instrumental in preventing the wages of workers 
in primary activities from rising on a par with the increase in 
productivity, and to the extent that they fail to do so, primary 
production loses all or part of the benefits of its technical progress. 
Such is the nature of the deterioration phenomenon. It pre-
supposes that the rate of expansion of production may outstrip 
that imposed by the relatively slow growth of demand, on the 
basis of availability of land and other natural resources and of 
manpower. Otherwise, if production were to lag behind demand, 
relative prices would tend to improve. Whether this improvement 
is entirely expressed in terms of an increase in income from the 
land or is also shared to some extent by the workers depends—as 
in the former case—on the effect produced by labour absorption 
in urban activities on the real level of wages in primary production. 
What grounds are there for hoping that conditions favouring 
an improvement in the terms of trade will prevail during these 
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next ten or fifteen years that will be decisive for Latin America's 
economic development? There are no visible signs that they will. 
On the contrary, the effort to quicken the slow growth of exports 
is becoming increasingly apparent in both the Latin American 
countries and the other countries in process of development that 
are competing with them in respect of production. And it is natural 
that in order to accomplish this aim efforts should be made to 
increase productivity. Moreover, these efforts will have to be ex-
tended to the whole of agricultural production if it is to meet the 
increasing claims of domestic demand. The manpower thus dis-
placed by technical progress will present a serious absorption 
problem which, if not solved, will curb the rise in wages that tech-
nical progress itself might make possible in primary export ac-
tivities. 
2. The impossibility of treating the deterioration as an isolated 
problem 
The absorption problem is not confined to particular producer 
countries but is common to all alike. If one country succeeds in 
making development sufficiently dynamic and creating suitable 
conditions for the retention of the benefits of technical progress 
in primary activities through a rise in wages, this does not mean 
that they can actually be retained, since unless other producer 
countries succeed in remedying the lack of dynamism also, their 
production will continue to expand at a rate faster than that dic-
tated by the income-elasticity of demand, and relative prices will 
decline. The first country will obviously have to follow the same 
trend in order to be able to compete on the world market. And to 
the extent that wages in its primary activities have undergone 
an improvement it will have to resort to subsidizing exports or 
devaluating the currency; in either case it will inevitably lose all 
or part of the fruits of its technical progress. 
By protection, of course, the level of nominal wages can be 
raised in conjunction with internal prices. This would contribute 
towards the retention of the benefits in question, provided that 
adequate manpower-absorption took place. But in this case again 
the other competitors would have to be in a position to do the 
same in order to prevent deterioration. And this is not a state of 
affairs that occurs in practice. 
The same applies to taxes. If the State were to tax exports 
commensurately with the increase in productivity in export ac-
tivities, the benefits could be retained just as if wages had been 
raised; but all the producer countries would have to adopt the 
same measure. 
Thus, it is clear that the problem of deterioration will not 
solve itself of its own accord, so long as the developing countries 
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fail to remedy their dynamic weakness—which will take a very long 
time—or if difficulties supervene that cannot be dealt with by tech-
nical advances in the development of primary production. 
3. Differences between central and peripheral countries 
So far the phenomenon of deterioration has been considered 
in relation to the peripheral countries. The next question is whether 
forces are not also to be found in the great centres whereby the 
fruits of their technical progress tend to be shifted abroad. It may 
be argued that such transfers do, in fact, take place, and that any 
deterioration in the terms of trade for the export activities of the 
peripheral countries is due to the fact that technical progress there 
has been more marked than in the industrial export activities of 
the great centres.10 In other words, the behaviour of the terms 
of trade in the past was attributable to the relative increase in 
productivity as between primary commodities and industrial goods. 
This argument might be admissible in a world in which every 
country had reached the same stage of development, but not while 
the disparities that are now apparent between the great centres 
and the peripheral countries still persist. From the standpoint of 
the terms of trade, the fundamental differences are as follows. 
First and foremost, the essentially industrial nature of exports 
from the great centres. Industrial goods usually have a very high 
income-elasticity of demand, and as soon as demand for certain 
products shows signs of becoming saturated with the passage of 
time, new products or new types of existing products appear which 
act as a continual stimulus to industrial demand. Labour is dis-
10
 This seems to have been the argument put forward by Lincoln 
Gordon, economist and United States Ambassador to Brazil, in his speech 
to the Brazilian National Economic Council on 29 January 1963, when he 
stated: "There have long been conflicting general theories about inherent 
long-range trends in the terms of trade. One old theory, now discredited, 
held that agricultural prices were bound to improve in relation to industrial 
prices because an increasing world population on a limited surface or 
arable land would be constantly bidding up food prices, whereas industrial 
output was indefinitely expansible. This disregarded the effects of the 
technological advance in agriculture, which have increased productivity even 
more rapidly than in industry, at least in the free world. For some years, 
the ECLA secretariat was arguing the contrary thesis, namely that the 
long-term trend was necessarily unfavourable to agriculture, but this argu-
ment was based largely on nineteenth-century British data which did not 
allow for reductions in shipping costs or for inherent difficulties in any long-
term measurement of comparative prices for manufactured goods. The nature 
of industrial products changes completely from decade to decade as new 
inventions are made, and they are also subject to constant improvements in 
quality. As a result, most serious scholars today are very skeptical as to the 
validity of any long-term generalizations about inherent trends in the terms 
of trade." FY I News Digest, United States Information Service, 63/7. 
Santiago, Chile, 4 April 1963. 
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placed from one industry to another, but industrial activity as a 
whole absorbs an increasing proportion of the increment in the 
economically active population, at least up to a certain limit, beyond 
which this function is progressively transferred to other labour-
absorbing activities. In primary production the reverse takes place ; 
demand for existing products is relatively slow in expanding, and 
new products or new varieties of products do not appear except 
in rare instances. Even when this occurs, it does not take place 
on a large enough scale to counteract the tendency of the labour 
force to shift to urban activities. 
The second basic disparity is that in the big industrial coun-
tries the absorption of labour from primary production and other 
labour ^ expelling activities has made great strides, a relatively small 
proportion of the economically active population remaining in those 
activities. For instance, the proportion in agriculture is 7 per cent 
in the United States and about IS per cent in the major indus-
trialized countries of Western Europe. This is highly significant, 
since the same increment in productivity in Latin American agri-
culture—where the average proportion is 45 per cent—represents 
a relatively much greater displacement of labour than in the ad-
vanced centres. If the large proportion of the economically active 
population that is still to be found in artisan activities and unskilled 
personal services is also taken into account, together with its 
tendency to shift to labour-asborbing activities, the full extent of 
the difference will be grasped. To put it another way, in the great 
centres a very large proportion of the economically active popula-
tion is found in the labour-absorbing activities and a very small 
proportion is found in those that are labour-expelling, while the 
reverse occurs in the peripheral countries. 
Consequently, the pressure exerted by the displaced popula-
tion on the level of wages in the labour-absorbing activities is 
relatively weak in the advanced centres and relatively heavy in 
the countries on the periphery. This is undoubtedly one of the 
reasons why trade unions in the former have acquired an increas-
ing ability to keep wages rising on a par with or even faster 
than the increase in productivity. What is more, in countries 
which are also manifestly lacking in dynamic force, the trade 
unions succeed in raising the level of wages in spite of unem-
ployment. 
In the peripheral countries, on the other hand, the relatively 
strong pressure applied by labour that is displaced or seeks to 
move elsewhere is a heavy handicap to trade union action. In so 
far as Latin America is concerned, it is only in exceptional cases 
that the trade unions have succeeded in getting wages raised in 
certain export activities irrespective of the general level in the 
region. But even if trade union action were effective in the case 
of export activities by virtue of the increase in productivity and 
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notwithstanding the dynamic weakness of the economy, the real 
wage increments could not be maintained for long unless they 
were matched by increments in other exporter countries that had 
likewise stepped up their productivity. 
In other words, it is not the relative differences in produc-
tivity increments in the primary export activities of the peripheral 
countries as compared with industrial activities in the great centres 
that are responsible for the trend of the terms of trade. Generally 
speaking, it is rather the differences between productivity in the 
centres, on the one hand, and in the peripheral countries, on the 
other, that have not been absorbed by the respective increases in 
wage rates. The ability to raise wages is very marked in the great 
centres, at least to the extent that the productivity of industrial 
activities improves, and only those industries whose productivity 
increment is above the average tend to transfer the balance abroad. 
In the peripheral countries, on the contrary, the fact that it is 
difficult to raise wages in export activities—and primary produc-
tion in general—means that they are constantly in danger of losing 
all or part of the average productivity increment in the activities 
concerned. Moreover, if technical progress has been greater in 
some countries than in others, the decline in prices brought about 
by the former may deprive the latter of a larger proportion of 
income than would correspond to their particular productivity 
increment. 
The favourable trend of the terms of trade in the distant past 
may have been due to the fact that, as the capacity of the industrial 
centres to raise the level of wages was then far less pronounced, 
the course of events was much the same as that now occurring in 
the peripheral countries. There may also have been difficulties in 
increasing primary production, whereas later this became easier 
because of the rise in productivity as a result of land reclamation 
and the utilization of new natural resources, as well as of improved 
transport facilities. 
4. Deterioration in the great industrial centres 
At all events, everything would seem to suggest that this in-
herent incapacity of the peripheral regions to retain the benefits 
of their technical progress will persist for a long time yet. The 
very situation of agricultural production in the large industrial 
centres, despite the advanced stage of development reached, affords 
striking evidence of this fact. There too relative prices are follow-
ing a downward trend, which is not incompatible with the tendency 
of industrial wages to appropriate the increases in productivity to 
the detriment of the primary activities. 
In the great centres no one has attempted to deny the existence 
of this trend, or to belittle its importance on the grounds that 
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have been adduced in connexion with the corresponding deteriora-
tion in the peripheral regions, namely, that statistics do not reflect 
the improvement in the quality of industrial products, or that 
the ratio cannot be accurately calculated on the basis of price 
indices. Perhaps this is because the reasons for the decline have 
become obvious. In the United States a technological revolution 
has taken place in agriculture which is now spreading to Western 
Europe, with similar consequences ; there too the tempo of produc-
tion is tending to outstrip the rate of growth of demand. A further 
population shift from the rural areas would be necessary—small 
as is the proportion of the active population still living there— 
and people are unwilling to migrate to the towns; they do not 
want to abandon their land, even in countries where the intensive 
absorption of manpower in industry and other activities is attract-
ing labour from abroad. 
To defend the internal terms of trade, recourse is had to 
various procedures : in the United States, to internal support prices 
which maintain a variable parity with the prices of the industrial 
goods purchased by agricultural workers, and to subsidies for ex-
ports to the international market; in Western Europe, to the 
tightening of restrictions on imports of agricultural commodities, 
as a means of broadening the market for the region's own produc-
tion and supporting high internal prices. Another possibility con-
templated is that of subsidizing exports to the world market if 
and when surpluses exist. 
These measures to defend agricultural relative prices on the 
home market—understandable as they are from the standpoint 
of the great centres—imply a still further aggravation of the con-
sequences of the slow growth of demand for agricultural exports 
from the peripheral countries. However, they have the merit of 
affording a concrete demonstration of the importance attached by 
the world centres to the decline in the prices of primary com-
modities, and at the same time indicate a possible way of solving 
the problem at the international level. 
5. Possibility of international retransfer of income 
Strictly speaking, what do these forms of intervention signify ? 
Simply the recognition that market forces do not provide an 
equitable solution for the problem in question. The technical 
progress achieved in industrial activities in the world centres had 
left agricultural production lagging in the rear. But as agricul-
ture manages to make up its leeway, the effects of its technical 
progress tend to be passed on to the rest of the community. The 
solution is therefore of a moral and political character: to re-
transfer to agricultural producers whatever income they may have 
lost through the operation of market forces whose action has been 
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preventing the levelling-up of their income with that of the urban 
sectors. In the long run, every income redistribution measure is 
essentially of this nature. 
Viewed from this angle, the process of remedying the deterio-
ration of the terms of trade in the peripheral countries becomes 
one vast problem of international redistribution of income, as a 
measure dictated not only by justice, but by the great policy design 
of helping the developing countries to cure their congénital weak-
ness, acquire the ability to retain the benefits of their technical 
progress and accelerate their economic and social development. 
But this involves something more than international co-operation. 
It would be impossible to adduce valid arguments based on inter-
national equity unless a serious effort were made to tackle the 
problem of internal equity, and the savings potential of the higher 
income groups were thoroughly exploited with the same end in 
view—that of speeding up the rate of development. 
Consequently, the international retransfer of income to com-
pensate the peripheral countries for the deterioration of their terms 
of trade could not be an automatic measure, but would have to 
be closely linked to their development plans, and to the economic 
and social effectiveness of the plans in question. 
This idea of retransfer really represents the more detailed 
working out of a suggestion put forward in 1954 at the Quin-
tandinha session. In the report presented by the ECLA secretariat11 
at the request of O AS, the agency sponsoring the conference, it 
was proposed that the countries which were consumers of primary 
commodities might establish an import duty equivalent in amount 
to the decrease in prices, and that the revenue accruing from this 
duty should be passed back to the producer countries. 
The results of a measure of this kind would be similar to those 
that might be obtained by the producer countries if they reached 
agreements to defend their prices not only against periodical fluc-
tuations, but also against a persistent downward trend. The com-
plexity of such procedures is undeniable, as is the fact that if 
prices were stabilized at relatively high levels, the expansion of 
production would be encouraged, with the consequent aggravation 
of the price decline. Professor Kaldor suggests how these con-
sequences might be averted in a brief report prepared not long 
ago.12 
11
 See again International Co-operation in a Latin American Develop-
ment Policy, op. cit. 
1 2
 See "Stabilizing the Terms of Trade of Under-developed Countries", 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VIII, No. 1, Santiago, Chile, 
March 1963, pp. 1 et seq. 
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In any case, the retransfer of income to primary-producing 
countries represents a very simple solution, since the resultant 
inflow of international resources would be used to increase capital 
formation, as a means of helping to remedy the lack of dynamism 
in the development process. Investment in rural areas would, of 
course, have to be assigned a high priority. The retransferred 
income would therefore not be used to compensate the decline in 
internal prices, except when they had reached a level so critically 
low as to discourage production. 
The scope of this idea should be clearly understood. Most 
of the rural workers fall within that half of the Latin American 
population whose income levels are extremely low. Would the 
application of international resources to economic development 
rather than to prices be effected at the expense of the effort to 
improve their standard of living? Obviously not. This latter aim 
would be served, however, by direct action to influence workers' 
income levels rather than prices, for export activities constitute 
only a fraction of the whole group of primary activities, and the 
income of workers employed in them could not be higher—save 
in exceptional cases—than the level prevailing in the primary 
activities in general. As has already been shown, the solution of 
this problem lies in remedying the lack of dynamism in the devel-
opment process, without prejudice to the pursuit of a wage policy 
reflecting the primary activities' increase in productivity. It is true 
that competition from other countries which did not follow a 
similar policy would adversely affect export prices in the way 
described elsewhere. Critical situations would thus arise, as a result 
of which part of the international resources would have to be used 
for supporting a domestic price level commensurate with the 
increase in the real income of rural workers. We would stress 
that these are general ideas rather than concrete suggestions, and 
(that they are presented here as a basis for the discussion of this 
vital problem of relative prices. 
6. External bottleneck and contribution of international resources 
The present chapter, which is now drawing to a close, has 
been devoted to an explanation of the persistent trend towards an 
external bottleneck in the Latin American countries and the 
essential need to combat it on two convergent fronts: (a) by 
promoting industrial exports to the rest of the world, especially 
to the great centres, without neglecting to encourage traditional 
exports to existing and new markets; and (b) by safeguarding 
the terms of trade. Another similarly convergent line of approach 
will subsequently be considered, namely, the Latin American com-
mon market.18 
18
 See chapter II below. 
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The contribution of international resources is not in itsel\ 
alternative solution to the bottleneck problem. Such resources ._ 
certainly of vital importance, but as a means of enabling structural 
changes to be introduced in foreign trade so that this problem 
can be attacked at the root. Unless the causes of the situation are 
thus extirpated, external contributions will be required indefinitely 
and in increasing volume. 
The consequences of this steady piling-up of external debt, 
under the present trade regime, have already made themselves 
manifest. The slow growth of exports and the downward trend 
of prices on the one hand, and the increasing service payments 
on foreign capital on the other, are progressively weakening the 
capacity to import, vis-à-vis the growing import requirements in 
respect of essential goods which are needed without delay and for 
which it is increasingly difficult to substitute domestic production. 
A more and more serious incompatibility between services and 
imports thus arises, and is frequently aggravated by the shortness 
of loan maturity periods, which entails excessively heavy amortiza-
tion payments.1* And as imports cannot easily be reduced, the 
only way out is to obtain further international resources to defray 
service payments, even when such contributions are not absolutely 
essential to fill the gaps in external capital formation. What can 
prevent the recurrence of this phenomenon if the structure of for-
eign trade is not remodelled? 
Certainly not exhortations to financial good conduct ; this will 
no longer suffice as a preventive. It might have been enough in 
the nineteenth century. There was then a clear and logical link 
between externally-geared development and foreign loans and 
investment. The latter were primarily applied, in one way or an-
other, to the expansion of exports. And this expansion made it 
relatively easy to defray the similarly growing service payments, 
without the necessity for international contributions to be in-
creased, as is now the case for reasons of external disequilibrium 
and shortage of capital. What is more, in several instances the 
expansion of exports permitted the gradual repatriation of the 
external capital received, so that the burden of services was light-
ened. If difficulties supervened, they were due to financial ill-
conduct, generally internal, but also, in some instances, external, 
for there was a little of everything in those vanished days. 
Within the logic of externally-geared development, the grant-
ing of financial favours had no place. Foreign loans and invest-
ment were a straightforward expression of mutual interest. Nor 
14
 It would be desirable to overhaul this burdensome amortization, sys-
tem—as is already being done in some cases—in order to secure some 
immediate relief in respect of external payments. 
87 
did the connotation of "assistance" exist on which emphasis is 
naturally laid during the periodical development crises. Loan 
operations in this way often become politically vulnerable in cer-
tain respects, both for the givers of the loans and for the receivers. 
Basically, the problem does not lie in inability to meet service 
payments—which might increase without representing an intoler-
able burden—but in the transfer difficulties which the bottleneck 
creates. Longer-term loans and a rapid expansion of exports would 
also make the burden in question very easy to carry, as far as 
external accounts were concerned. There would then be plenty 
of scope for good advice to bear fruit ; and, moreover, a deaf ear 
could be turned to those admonitions—uttered from a monetary 
standpoint—which often suggest a false dilemma in relation to 
stability and development, for if the external sector were restored 
to prosperity in a new pattern very different from that at present 
followed, our countries would be released from harassing pressures, 
and would acquire the essential freedom of choice. And only when 
the structural obstacles that now make choice inevitable had been 
surmounted, would the alternatives present themselves in their 
proper terms: external co-operation to accelerate development, or 
a more thorough-going internal effort to do so. 
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Chapter II 
OBSTACLES TO THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMON 
MARKET 
I. QUANTITATIVE TARGETS 
1. Description of targets 
Within the obsolete pattern of international trade which has 
been discussed elsewhere, the Latin American economies focused 
their development—as they still do—upon the great industrial 
centres, making little contact with one another except for a limited 
trade in certain primary commodities; industrialization developed 
in watertight compartments, as the time-honoured phrase has it; 
and a common market has become an imperative need as another 
means of correcting the trend towards an external bottleneck and 
promoting the economic viability of the industrialization process. 
The Latin American Free-Trade Area, concerted with notable 
speed, has easily surpassed, during the first two years of its 
existence, the minimum liberalization commitments stipulated in 
the Montevideo Treaty. But in face of the herculean task it is 
called upon to perform, its rate of progress might become unduly 
deliberate and cautious. Such a rate might be justifiable if our times 
were like those former days in which the striking expansion of 
international trade gave a steady impetus to the Latin American 
economies; but not as matters stand at present, when the serious 
obstacles to their development uncompromisingly demand a new 
outlook, firm determination and a boldly constructive spirit. 
It would be a mistake to consider that the instruments estab-
lished under the Treaty are not intrinsically efficacious. They are ; 
but important policy decisions are required before this efficacy can 
be reflected in concrete achievements capable of withstanding what-
ever factors may make for stagnation in the near future. The 
system of periodical selective negotiations at present applied may 
perhaps find the atmosphere becoming unpropitious, with the con-
sequent risk that the whole business may be limited to a series 
of narrow and halfhearted preferential arrangements. 
This danger will persist until the quantitative targets for the 
reduction and elimination of tariffs and other restrictions within 
a specific time-limit are more clearly established, since without 
them there will be no definite points of reference on which the 
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negotiations can be based. But it would not be advisable to set 
up these targets in isolation, without laying the foundations for 
complementarity agreements under which industries of great im-
portance for development strategy could be programmed; and 
this could not be done unless the idea of reciprocity were clarified 
and effective ways of ensuring it devised. Nor could this in its 
turn be satisfactorily achieved unless organs to promote reciprocal 
trade were established. All these are matters for the important 
policy decisions referred to above. 
Why is it so essential to fix these quantitative targets? The 
Governments have assumed tariff elimination commitments, in 
respect of traditional commodities particularly, in order to comply 
with GATT regulations. But this is a relatively minor undertaking. 
It is also indispensable that industrial products should be covered, 
including both those that are manufactured today and those that 
will inevitably have to be manufactured tomorrow, with increas-
ingly difficult and costly techniques. 
In order that the benefits of the Area may be gradually ex-
tended to the whole range of Latin American production, the 
quantitative targets will have to be established forthwith. Other-
wise, the negotiations would very quickly lose their binding and 
automatic character, and the next step would be pressure from 
individual countries to obtain concessions in respect of specific 
products, which might often fail to coincide with the interests and 
claims of the rest; and this would entail the risk that the process 
of reducing and eliminating tariff duties might be gradually brought 
to a standstill. The establishment of quantitative targets would 
help to bring about a radical change in such an attitude; each 
country would have to make the effort to introduce a minimum 
number of reductions and eliminations every year so that the 
targets agreed upon could gradually be attained. 
In what might these targets consist? Several formulas are 
conceivable, but the simplest and most practicable is the arithmetic 
mean of tariff duties. We suggest, therefore, that within a period 
of twelve years—the time-limit is not what matters most, and it 
might be a little longer or shorter—the tariff average among the 
countries members of the Association should be lowered to not 
more than 15 per cent, and that, furthermore, within the same 
period all other restrictions of a protectionist nature should be 
lifted. 
The establishment of these targets should be combined with 
the obligation to reduce all duties to a maximum of 30 per cent 
in the case of existing industries developing at the natural rate 
of growth, as well as in that of agricultural activities, and of 10 per 
cent in the case of dynamic industries—a distinction prompted by 
motives which will be expounded later. 
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It would be inexpedient to confine attention to the final 
target, without agreeing upon a gradual procedure with inter-
mediary objectives. Thus, by halfway through the period stipu-
lated, the tariff average should not exceed 30 per cent, and the 
maximum should not be higher than 60 per cent for non-dynamic 
industries and agriculture and 20 per cent for dynamic industries : 
i.e., double the rates established as the final target. Other restric-
tions would also have to be reduced by one-half midway through 
the twelve-year period, and before the final time-limit was reached 
a new agreement would have to be concluded, in the light of the 
experience acquired, so that the same policy might be pursued 
during a second stage which it would be premature to envisage 
now. 
It would also be advisable to agree upon a special procedure 
for very high tariffs, for example, those which were more than 
treble the maximum allowable for the group to which the product 
pertained (dynamic or non-dynamic industries). The reduction 
from the present tariff level to a level three times as high as the 
maximum which was to be reached in two stages would be 
effected proportionally and in the course of a very few years. 
When three times the maximum had been reached, the process 
of reduction would continue as described above. The importance 
of this more rapid constriction of the margin of excess in the case 
of very high duties lies in the fact that the reductions which may 
in practice give rise to market competition and spur on the 
producer activities are those corresponding to the lowest step of 
the extremely high duty ; for example, to a level not above 90 per 
cent in the case of the products of slow-growth industries. If in 
such instances a special procedure were not adopted, the lowering 
of these very high duties might be completely inoperative from the 
standpoints of competition and trade throughout almost the whole 
of the transitional period. Its practical effects would make them-
selves felt only in the course of the final two or three years, with 
the result that not only would the advance towards integration 
be retarded, but difficult situations would pile up that might arouse 
strong opposition. 
There is no need to go into technical details in order to adopt 
a policy decision. A standard nomenclature would of course have 
to be introduced; but these and others are questions on which 
technical experts would have to formulate recommendations for 
submission to the Governments. The essential point is that a high-
level policy decision should establish the quantitative targets, since 
in the absence of fixed cardinal points there is good cause to fear 
that discussion might go on for years and years and still no sig-
nificant progress be achieved. 
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Within the system of averages different situations would arise ; 
while tariff duties on one series of products might be completely 
eliminated in the period agreed upon, in other instances it would 
be expedient to maintain a reasonable degree of protection. The 
time-limits might be extended for countries at a relatively less 
advanced stage of development, in conformity with a principle 
which is fortunately enshrined in the Montevideo Treaty. 
There is no escaping the fact that the targets suggested may 
not seem very encouraging to those who would like to make 
straight for the common market by means of the total elimination 
of tariffs, and, at the other extreme, may appear recklessly ambi-
tious to those who bestow the name of "prudence" on the tre-
mendous imprudence of taking only clumsy and hesitant steps to 
meet the grave historic challenge of these and other structural 
reforms. 
Those who advocate the immediate establishment of the com-
mon market through total tariff liberalization cherish the hope that 
the free interplay of economic forces will solve all problems, with-
out any kind of planning. Planning is not incompatible with com-
petition. The latter is an indispensable requisite for the efficacious 
operation of the economic system under which we live. Para-
doxical as it may seem, some intervention in the free play of 
economic forces is necessary in order to create the right condi-
tions for competition to function: impersonal intervention on the 
part of the State, designed to guide, safeguard and encourage 
individual action in economic life, but not to interfere with it or 
subject it to arbitrary restrictions. 
Customs protection has been carried to excess and, by limit-
ing or completely preventing competition from abroad, has fre-
quently given rise to internal restrictive practices or monopolistic 
combines which weaken the incentive to attain satisfactory levels 
of productivity. 
Even without the Latin American Free-Trade Area, it would 
have been advisable gradually to reduce protection to a reasonable 
level, if the chronic trend towards balance-of-payments disequi-
libria had not so frequently intervened. 
2. The play of competitive forces, and its limitations 
Once the need to revitalize competition is recognized, the 
question is how this is to be done. There are three main areas 
to consider: (a) agriculture, (b) existing non-dynamic industries, 
and (c) the dynamic industries. 
In agriculture the traditional export products are already the 
subject of an undertaking to abolish tariffs completely within the 
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next ten years. But it is not enough to assume a commitment of 
this nature and then leave things to work out on their own. Pro-
grammes for the rational distribution of production within the 
Area must be formulated, that take into account not only present 
demand, but also the considerable increase in demand in the future, 
which will make it necessary to cultivate land of widely differing 
productivity. Such programmes will in some cases require special 
regulatory measures. Only thus can competition develop without 
bringing distortions in its train, since at all costs we must ensure 
that productive land does not lie fallow, even if it is used other-
wise than at present, and that manpower is not left unemployed, 
with no possibility of absorption either in agriculture or elsewhere. 
An outright abolition of tariffs might have this disastrous result, 
for both traditional and other agricultural commodities. 
The situation is similar as regards existing industries, most 
of which have reached a vegetative stage of growth, where demand 
increases only gradually, in line with the growth of the population. 
Income redistribution would undoubtedly give a strong impetus to 
these industries, and facilitate their adaptation to the needs of the 
common market. To allow the industries time to effect this adap-
tation, a gradual and well-thought-out reduction and abolition of 
tariffs is essential. If the pace were too rapid, and the aim were 
total abolition of protection in this first stage, there might be a 
flood of new investment to replace the stock of capital in order 
to increase productivity at the expense of manpower absorption. 
In fact, this is the main reason behind the "average" formula, 
according to which some tariffs are reduced to zero, while others 
can continue their protective functions in moderation. Neverthe-
less, it is all a question of degree, and the flexibility in question 
must not in any case be used to maintain tariffs higher than the 
above-mentioned maximum of 30 per cent for longer than twelve 
months, for either the existing non-dynamic industries or primary 
production. : ' th) 
The case of the dynamic industries is generally very different, 
since they have great development possibilities, especially the new 
industries that will have to be established in the next few years 
to continue the import substitution policy, but this time within 
the multi-national framework of the Area. As we know, these 
are industries manufacturing capital goods, durable consumer 
goods, and intermediate products. In many of these cases a total 
abolition of tariffs would be desirable, whereas in others the tariffs 
will have to be maintained, but at a level not exceeding the 10-
per-cent maximum previously referred to. 
It will also be advisable to abolish all tariff duties within a 
short time—perhaps half the period—for basic raw materials of 
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either mineral or agricultural origin, including petrochemical prod-
ucts. This step is of great importance, for the disparities between 
the prices of the industrial products of different countries often 
derive from the varying prices at which the raw materials are 
available. Some countries customarily protect marginal production 
of such materials, and as a result industry has to operate at a high 
cost level, even though its relative efficiency may be superior to 
that of the countries of the Area which have access to cheap raw 
materials, or import them under low tariffs. 
The countries belonging to the Latin American Free-Trade 
Area produce practically all the basic raw materials, from fuels 
to metals, from cotton to wool, from leather to iron ore. If import 
duties on these basic raw materials were abolished, and a common 
tariff worked out to apply to third countries, it would be possible 
to affect large-scale substitution in respect of imports from outside 
the Area. 
It is very likely that a policy of this kind would in some cases 
mean the end of marginal production. It would then be necessary 
to seek means of compensating workers and entrepreneurs for the 
resulting hardship. This could be one of the functions of the Fund 
advocated below. 
Basic raw materials generally have a very low unit value, and 
the incidence of freight is so high that in itself it constitutes a 
form of protection for the production of areas far apart as those 
of Latin America. Consequently it may be that the adjustments 
that will have to be made in the marginal sectors in question will 
be on a smaller scale than those required in the rest of industry. 
3. Industrial complementarity agreements 
The dynamic industries are those that offer the greatest 
possibilities for complementarity agreements. Let us now take up 
this second point, which, like the first, calls for a high-level policy 
decision. Unlike the slower-growing industries, the dynamic indus-
tries need not so much a renewal of the stock of capital as capital 
investment in new industrial plants, or a sharp expansion of avail-
able capacity in order to meet a rapidly increasing demand. Here 
the problem is to ensure that all the individual member countries 
will derive equal benefits within the common market from the 
co-ordination of investment and its due distribution, either in the 
same industries appropriately integrated, or in different activities. 
But this relates to the application of the principle of reciprocity 
under discussion: what needs to be underlined here is that an 
equitable distribution of benefits cannot be expected merely as a 
result of the play of economic forces. It will have to be ensured 
by programmes for industrial complementarity between particular 
94 
industries in this sector, and between those industries and other 
activities. 
There are various possible ways of achieving this distribu-
tion of industries. One would be to give preference within the 
Area to the exports of a country to which a particular industrial 
activity had been allocated under the programme, without extend-
ing this preference to the other member countries. But this might 
result in a patchwork of preferential treatments, and might also 
lead to monopolies, at the expense of technical progress and of 
the consumer. The same would occur if in the other member 
countries it were forbidden to establish industries not allocated 
to them under the programme. Undoubtedly such privileges could 
be limited in duration, but there would be a risk that the industries 
thus sheltered would become accustomed to protection, and it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to abandon preferential treat-
ment and restore competition within the Area.1 
Does this mean that the activities established in a country in 
accordance with a complementarity programme would be exposed 
from the outset to the establishment and the competition of similar 
plants, either in the same country or in other member countries? 
If this were so, there might be insufficient inducement in some 
cases to take part in a programme that might founder within a 
short period. The solution is to provide incentives to the industries 
established under the programme, in the form of tax benefits, 
technical assistance and long-term financing, which for a given 
period could not be extended to other similar plants whose estab-
lishment might be contemplated either in the same country or in 
the Area. Thus there would be initial advantages for the pro-
grammed industries, but they would have to keep constantly on 
the alert for potential competition from the other plants in ques-
tion, and this would drive them to make use of those initial ad-
vantages to consolidate their technical and financial position and 
produce at a reasonable cost level. 
* 
The Montevideo Treaty provides for such complementarity 
agreements, but the system of incentives has not yet been organ-
ized. However, it is not solely for this reason that thus far only 
one agreement has been concerted, in spite of the fact that the 
prospects looked so promising. It should be recalled that the ex-
orbitant restrictions imposed by many of our countries on certain 
imported goods, for balance-of-payments reasons—over and above 
the excessive tariffs already existing—have led private enterprise 
to follow the easier path of confining itself to the domestic market, 
1
 These observations do not apply to Central America, where the 
establishment of a common market in particular conditions of industrial 
development is well advanced. 
95 
producing at a very high cost level, but nevertheless making sub-
stantial profits. 
What 19 happening in the motor vehicle industry is instruc-
tive. Not only are there a number of countries all trying to do 
the same thing, but there is also an unbelievable proliferation of 
anti-economic plants within single countries.2 It is to be feared that 
any programme, either in this industry or in other complementarity 
industries, however equitable it may be, will meet with perhaps 
insuperable opposition, if there is no firm resolve to abolish restric-
tions and gradually reduce duties as between the member coun-
tries until moderate tariffs are reached that do not exceed the 
maximum of 10 per cent previously referred to. In these circum-
stances the experts asked to study a given programme would 
not discuss whether or not complementarity arrangements would 
be expedient for this or that industry, and whether or not protec-
tion ought to be reduced, but how to put the Governments' deci-
sions into effect. 
The case is not the same for the steel industry, but this is 
clearly developing in each country on a basis of self-sufficiency 
with the aim of producing the full range of products whatever 
the cost. Furthermore, a very odd position tends to be adopted 
here : let us first integrate within our own country, and then think 
about multi-national integration. Unfortunately it will then be too 
late. At present Latin America has a production capacity of 5.5 
million tons of steel ingots, and by 1970 this figure will have 
risen to 18 million tons, according to existing plans. Yet 20 per 
cent of total consumption will have to be supplied through im-
ports. The equivalent of 3,000 million dollars will be needed to 
carry out these plans. Will this considerable amount of funds in 
short supply be invested on the basis of the actual structure now 
existing in each country, or will some form of specialization be 
sought ? 
There is a vast field for these complementarity arrangements, 
without by any means excluding some of the non-dynamic indus-
tries. But it is on a number of dynamic activities that attention 
will have to be concentrated, since they do not face the same 
handicaps as the slower-growing industries when it comes to a 
definite tariff liberalization policy. 
2
 Suffice it to mention that, apart from Argentina and Brazil, countries 
that already manufacture motor vehicles in the strict sense of the term, 
there are four other countries—Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela— 
that have vehicle assembly plants and are about to embark on production. 
The total Latin American market for passenger cars, estimated at slightly 
over 300,000 units a year, will have to be divided between something like 
forty existing and potential producers, whereas each of the main European 
producers supplies the market with between 250,000 and 500,000 units a year. 
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Nevertheless, it is likely that certain difficulties will arise if 
all countries, on an equitable footing, are to find their own way in 
establishing new production lines aimed at the common market, 
within the same industrial branch, in the light of each country's 
particular resources or industrial structure. In order to cope with 
this problem, it may be appropriate for the complementarity agree-
ments to be prepared and negotiated simultaneously for a wide 
range and variety of industrial activities, so as to make it easier 
for each country to secure the essential reciprocity in the devel-
opment of new industries capable of competing in the common 
market. 
4. The principle of reciprocity 
In the last analysis, the effectiveness both of such agreements 
and of the whole system under consideration also depends on the 
application of the principle of reciprocity. The interpretation of 
this principle, enshrined in the Montevideo Treaty, must be 
crystal clear. No member country can expect to derive from the 
Area more benefits than it offers. But the Treaty does not stipulate 
what measures will have to be adopted to correct a persistent 
inequality of benefits in its application. 
In this connexion, the first thing to do is to provide for the 
technical and financial means by which activities in the less 
favoured countries can be promoted. This must be a collective 
commitment entered into by all members of the Association, in 
the manner explained below. 
Secondly, the countries which constantly export more than 
they import from the Area must take measures to restore equitable 
treatment. A more rapid reduction of restrictions and tariffs with 
a view to stimulating exports to deficit countries might be effec-
tive if accompanied by a reasonable margin of preferential treat-
ment in favour of Area products. Here there is a serious lacuna 
in the Treaty which must be filled. Tariff reduction would be 
pointless if its application to the rest of the world involved the 
abolition of preferential treatment or reduced it to ineffectual 
proportions. Provision would thus have to be made for a minimum 
margin of preferential treatment within the Area in favour of items 
for which tariffs were reduced. At some point maximum margins 
must be set, but this should be considered together with the com-
mon tariff applicable to the rest of the world. 
Thirdly, the less favoured countries might reduce their tariffs 
and abolish restrictions at a slower rate in order to remedy the 
disequilibrium with respect to benefits, in extreme cases where 
the other measures had not had the desired effect ; but this would 
not exempt them from taking their own corrective measures, par-
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ticularly, in regard to the over-valuation of currency, which might 
vitiate the whole process of reciprocity. Monetary distortions of 
this or any other kind must be ruled out if the Area is to func-
tion properly. 
A clear definition of the principle of reciprocity will help to 
dispel the misgivings entertained in some circles regarding com-
plementarity agreements. It will not always be possible to work 
out absolutely equal levels of trade benefits in every agreement or 
set of agreements. Hence equality will have to be sought through 
the medium of other activities. If this had to de done in every 
instance, the conclusion of complementarity agreements might 
become lengthy and complicated, when it should be precisely the 
opposite. Herein lies the significance of the following principle: 
each member country should be given an assurance that if the 
agreements and the reduction or abolition of duties do not provide 
equality of benefits, other measures will be taken to achieve it. 
This must be a binding obligation on all the countries concerned, 
and particularly those which regularly export more then they 
import. 
From another angle, it would seem desirable that the applica-
tion of the principle of reciprocity should also be linked to a pay-
ments agreement. The effect of measures to ensure equality of 
benefits for a particular country might not be felt for some time, 
and meanwhile the country concerned would have to spend dollars, 
which are usually in short supply, to pay the creditor countries 
of the Area. little imagination is needed to appreciate the reluc-
tance of monetary authorities to support agreements on com-
plementarity or tariff reductions designed to stimulate competi-
tion, if these are likely to entail disequilibria which will take time 
to correct. The debtor country must be given ample time to pay 
and the creditor country must be urged to use its balances for 
additional imports from the Area and, at the same time, to take 
measures aimed at preventing further disequilibria. All this would 
be done as a practical expression of the principle of reciprocity. 
Of course, such payments agreements, confined to the Area, would 
lose much of their point if an increase in exports to the rest of 
the world improved the balance of payments. In the meantime, 
they would stimulate the move towards the common market. 
II. T H E OPERATION OF THE COMMON MARKET 
1. Promotional organs 
At this juncture another important question should be raised 
which calls for top-level policy decisions and concerns the need 
for promotional organs within the common market. First, however, 
a brief digression will be made on a subject that has a bearing not 
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only on the common market but on economic development in its 
broadest sense—the technically and economically backward state 
of Latin American enterprise in comparison with its counterpart 
in the great industrial centres. Unless an extensive and sustained 
effort is made to narrow the gap little by little, there is a danger 
of building on quicksands. 
The formation of the common market offers a peculiarly 
favourable opportunity for finding a solution to this problem. 
There is general concern lest foreign enterprise, because of the 
superiority referred to above, as well as its knowledge of the 
different markets, will make better use of the vast opportunities 
for trade that are emerging in the member countries and assume 
a leading role in complementarity agreements and in the area 
in general. Unless the risk is averted, this great undertaking will 
not be able to advance very far because of the formidable opposi-
tion it is liable to provoke. The fundamental solution is to sup-
port Latin American enterprise so that it can acquire maximum 
impetus in the formation of the common market, and stand up 
to foreign enterprise, either by making common cause with it or 
by competing on an equal footing, since competition on an unequal 
basis usually entails the alternative of liquidation of the weaker 
party of its subordination to the stronger. 
Systematic support for Latin American enterprise in industry 
and agriculture is called for in three main areas: (a) comple-
mentarity activities; (b) export activities, particularly in the 
countries that are less advanced and those that have not secured 
equality of reciprocal benefits; and (c) the activities that should 
be modified in the light of competition, as well as those that it 
may prove necessary to establish in order to absorb the manpower 
turned away in the process of adjustment. 
Looked at from another angle, the work of promotion should 
be carried out in the two fields of tax incentives and of technical 
and financial action. On the technical side, a promotional organ 
should be set up to plan and organize the studies required for 
the fulfilment of the aims set forth above, in close contact with 
Governments and with the private sector. 
The experience acquired by the ECLA secretariat through its 
contacts with industrial circles in our countries has convinced us 
of the need for promotion activities of this kind, and of the 
effective collaboration that can be given by these same circles. 
There is no suggestion that a vast and complex mechanism should 
be set up comprising a host of experts of various kinds; what is 
involved is preparatory co-ordinating work, the services of such 
experts being obtained within the present system of international 
or bilateral technical assistance, or on the basis of special contracts. 
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A promotional organ of this kind could also play a useful 
part in the submission of plans in order to obtain the requisite 
funds, as well as in the preparation of the projects in which the 
plans must find expression once they are approved in principle. 
This is another of the weak points in Latin American experience, 
with respect to which the promotional organ could help by chan-
nelling international technical assistance, both public and private, 
and combining it with local technical skills. Lastly, it could also 
collaborate in engaging the technical services necessary for putting 
the plants into operation in the first instance. Its functions would, 
in reality, be similar to those carried out by development agencies 
in some of the Latin American countries. In the present case its 
sphere of action would extend to several countries, but it would 
work in very close contact with the development agencies. In fact, 
it would be a kind of development corporation for the common 
market. 
Support for Latin American enterprise in the formation of 
the common market must be complemented by suitable medium 
and long-term financing schemes. The Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank has repeatedly evinced its determination to take an 
active part in this operation. If the Governments concerned decide 
to give a strong impetus to the advance towards a common market, 
by taking the major policy decisions that are needed, it may be 
asked whether the limited resources with which the Bank in 
question has come into being—apart, of course, from any sub-
sequent requirements of the Latin American Free-Trade Area— 
will enable it to assume the leading role that it should undoubtedly 
take in this great task. Admittedly, there is no definite basis of 
judgement for determining the volume of additional resources 
that such special financing operations will need, but it would not 
be over-rash to estimate them at about 500 million dollars, in 
the form of quotas, with all due allowance for the possible and 
desirable participation of private foreign capital in complementarity 
arrangements.8 
It is evident that the policy decision to create such a fund would 
be merely symbolic if it were confined to the member Govern-
ments. The United States has indicated that it is willing to co-
operate in the formation of the common market ; and its participa-
tion in this fund, besides being intrinsically significant, would be 
clear proof that its primary motive is not the desire to open up 
new fields for private United States investment, but the wish to 
make a positive contribution to the cultivation of our own devel-
opment capacity. 
8
 This type of financing for common market industries and other ac-
tivities should not be confused with the system of export credits that is 
being contemplated by IDB, although the two are of course closely linked. 
100 
This might also afford an opportunity for the members of 
the European Common Market—and other developed countries— 
to support the effort in question. It is true that such financial 
co-operation could not act as an alternative to the suppression of 
the discriminatory treatments applied to Latin American products 
and the modification of the excessive protectionism whereby their 
entry into the developed countries is hindered or prevented. Both 
measures are needed. But there can be no doubt that the technical 
and financial co-operation of such countries in the establishment 
of the Latin American common market, by whatever channel were 
deemed appropriate, and their backing for Latin American enter-
prise itself, will be of powerful aid in dispelling the concern and 
misgiving widely felt throughout the region with respect to its 
future relations with the European Common Market countries. 
2. The economic unity of Central America 
The Central American countries have made significant pro-
gress towards the establishment of their regional common market. 
They have assumed firm commitments to put it into complete 
operation in a few years, and the Governments are displaying 
active interest in the planning of integration industries. Central 
America is thus moving towards economic unity, and will there-
fore be able to join the free-trade area as a unit, entirely without 
detriment to the implementation of its own plans. It should also 
be accorded the treatment established for an economic unit at a 
relatively less advanced stage of development, which would mean 
that it could reduce its external tariff vis-à-vis other States mem-
bers of the Latin American Free-Trade Association at a slower 
rate than was expected of the more highly-developed member 
countries. 
3. Progress towards the common market: magnitude oj the effort 
required 
Practical and simultaneous action in all the fields just men-
tioned is an essential requisite if elements of automaticity are to 
be incorporated, without risk, in the system of targets proposed. 
But this same automaticity intensifies the urgency of the need 
to lay down clearly-defined guidelines for the gradual advance 
towards the common market, since from them will have to be 
deduced the indispensable basic principles for the formulation of 
each country's economic development plans. Planning itself, as it 
evolves, will gradually afford better criteria in the light of which 
to tackle common market problems. In other words, there must 
be a close and reciprocal relation between the principles determin-
ing the allocation of resources under national plans and the meas-
ures establishing the common market. 
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All this calls for a more sustained and far-reaching effort 
than Latin America has ever yet had to undertake. And it must 
be approached with foresight and courage, without which nothing 
great or lasting can be achieved in community life. Many for-
midable obstacles will have to be surmounted. Discipline will have 
to be imposed on competition; and competition conditioned by 
State intervention will necessitate major adjustments in economic 
activity as tariffs are lowered or eliminated. But this is a sine 
qua non for the dynamic effectiveness of the system. 
Difficulties of another kind will also have to be faced. As a 
general rule, integration efforts are being carried out independently 
of the work of planning, and co-ordination will be indispensable. 
The proposals of the Latin American Free-Trade Association in 
this connexion are worth noting.4 Similarly, integration efforts 
will have to be taken into consideration in the introduction of 
structural reforms, and instruments that are not incompatible with 
them chosen; while, in turn, the commitments emanating from 
such efforts will likewise have to be compatible with the structural 
reforms. 
In other words, the advance towards the common market will 
entail a continuous series of co-ordination efforts, which will not 
be spontaneously generated, but will grow out of carefully-devised 
measures adopted at the national or international level, as the case 
may be. It will undoubtedly involve the imposition of discipline on 
internal economic policy—a discipline which in any event is in-
evitable, irrespective of common-market considerations. Over-
valuation or under-valuation of currencies will cause serious dis-
ruptions of reciprocal trade. This does not mean, however, that 
the common market cannot be brought into operation, but merely 
that steps must be taken to put an end to such distortions, which 
do harm not only to inter-Latin American trade but to trade as a 
whole, besides producing other serious repercussions of an internal 
nature. The existence of a common market will certainly make 
the need for a sound monetary policy, adapted to development 
requirements, yet more imperative. 
All this will not be easy. But too much is at stake in Latin 
America today for the difficulties to be shirked. They must be 
tackled in all fields, and discouragement, indifference and defeatism 
must not be allowed to gain ground among those who fail to grasp 
the true significance of what is going on. The course of events 
cannot be halted, for on the horizon glimmers the dawning of a 
4
 At a meeting of the representatives of the ALALC agencies concerned 
with the planning, encouragement and guidance of industrial development, 
which was to be held at Lima about the time of writing, several problems 
of this type were to be discussed. 
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new will to achieve—perhaps in the not too distant future—what 
at present is left undone, in a futile endeavour to perpetuate all 
that must be demolished because it no longer meets dynamic 
requirements. Let us demolish it with our own hands and in our 
own way, now, when history beckons impatiently to Latin America 
and offers it, in the midst of a world of antagonisms and anomalies, 
a unique opportunity to build anew, and to set its own vigorously 
authentic stamp on the ineluctable and sweeping process of change. 
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